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COMMENT
PROVING CAUSATION IN "LOSS OF A
CHANCE" CASES: A PROPORTIONAL
APPROACH
For more than a century, an individual who has been harmed because of
another's negligence has been allowed to recover damages from the person
causing the harm.1 To prevail in a negligence lawsuit, the plaintiff must
show: (1) that the defendant owed the plaintiff' a certain duty of care;3 (2)
that the duty was breached;4 (3) that the breach caused the plaintiff harm;5
and (4) that actual harm resulted. 6 All of these elements have been the sub-
ject of considerable debate among judges and legal scholars.7 Yet, the "cau-
1. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 28, at 161 (5th ed. 1984). The
authors note that "negligence began to gain recognition as a separate and independent basis of
tort liability [during the first half of the nineteenth century]." Its rise, they state, coincided to
a significant extent with the increase in the number of accidents that occurred during the
Industrial Revolution. Id.
2. The identity of the plaintiff naturally will vary depending on whether the action is one
for personal injury or one for wrongful death. For purposes of simplification, this Comment
will generally use the term "plaintiff" regardless of whether the plaintiff in a particular case is
the individual who was harmed (personal injury) or whether the plaintiff is a survivor of the
individual harmed (wrongful death).
3. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 1, § 30, at 164-65. A duty has been defined as
"an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular
standard of conduct toward another." Id. § 53, at 356. To answer the question whether one
owes another a particular duty, one must ask the question "whether the plaintiffs interests are
entitled to legal protection against the defendant's conduct." Id. at 357. It is clear, then, that
the term duty "is only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which
lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to [legal] protection." Id. at 358.
4. Id. § 30. Courts frequently state that proof of the breach of a duty owed establishes
negligence. Id. The two following elements merely determine whether the negligence is "ac-
tionable"-that it will give rise to an action for damages.
5. See id. §§ 30, 41-45 (containing an extensive discussion of both cause-in-fact and prox-
imate cause principles). See generally L. GREEN, JUDGE & JURY 196-267 (1930); R. KEETON,
LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1963).
6. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 1, § 30, at 165. A defendant may act negli-
gently without causing any harm. In such instances, only a nominal amount may be recov-
ered. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 907 comment a (1979). Prosser and Keeton also
note that negligence which causes a "threat of future harm, not yet realized, is not enough."
W. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 30, at 165. In this regard, see infra notes 301-05
(discussing future harm cases).
7. See, e.g., M. SHAPO, THE DUTY TO ACT: TORT LAW, POWER, & PUBLIC POLICY
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sation" requirement has undoubtedly spurred the greatest judicial
controversy.8
The law of negligence divides causation into two parts: cause-in-fact and
proximate cause.9 The traditional cause-in-fact test is the "but for" test.' 0
The plaintiff must show that "but for" the defendant's breach of duty, harm
would not have occurred." Where two or more causes concur to produce
harm, and either cause alone would have produced the harm, the "but for"
test is replaced by the "substantial factor" test.' 2 Otherwise, each defendant
could claim that his negligence was not a "but for" cause of the harm, and
escape liability.' 3 In such cases, the plaintiff must show that one or more of
the potential causes was a "substantial factor" in producing the harm.'4 The
second aspect of causation, proximate cause, involves the legal policies limit-
ing the liability of a defendant whose conduct was a cause-in-fact of the
injury.1" Because harm, in a philosophical sense, can be traced to very re-
mote causes, the law limits the chain of causation to causes that are fairly
"4proximate."16
The plaintiff in a negligence action need not prove cause-in-fact to a cer-
(1977); Campbell, Duty, Fault and Legal Cause, 1938 Wis. L. REV. 402; Dias, The Breach
Problem and the Duty of Care, 30 TUL. L. REV. 377 (1956); Dias, The Duty Problem in Negli-
gence, 13 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 198 (1955).
8. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 1, § 41, at 263 n.l.
9. See generally id. §§ 41-45. Cause-in-fact, however, is generally viewed as a part of the
overall "proximate cause" question. Id. § 42, at 279.
10. Id. § 41, at 265.
11. Thus, if the harm would not have occurred "but for" the defendant's negligence, the
negligence is a cause-in-fact of the harm. If, on the other hand, harm would have occurred in
spite of the defendant's act or omission, the act or omission is not a "but for" cause of the
harm for which the defendant can be held liable. Id. at 266. The "but for" test is increasingly
being replaced by the "substantial factor" test. See, e.g., Roberson v. Counselman, 235 Kan.
1006, 686 P.2d 149 (1984).
12. Id. at 266-68. Despite the amorphous nature of the expression "substantial factor,"
Prosser thought it undesirable to reduce the concept to more concrete terms. He believed that
a jury could use its judgment in determining whether a particular force was a substantial factor
in producing harm. Id. at 267. The notion, however, seems to have retained the "but for"
requirement except where each of two forces would have been sufficient to cause the harm
independently of the other. Id. at 268.
13. Id. at 266-67.
14. Courts have sometimes used the substantial factor test in conjunction with legal cau-
sation. Id. at 278. Use of the substantial factor rule in this fashion, Prosser and Keeton note,
often allows the jury to decide questions that should be decided by the judge. Id.
15. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 1, § 42.
16. Prosser and Keeton remark that although the word "proximate" literally means
"near,". "mechanical closeness" is not the actual meaning of the term "proximate cause." Id.
at 273. A more accurate label for the concept would be "legal cause" or "responsible cause."
Id. Proximate cause involves questions of cause-in-fact, apportionment of damages, liability
for unforeseeable consequences, intervening causes, as well as the shifting of responsibility
from one entity to another. Id. at 279.
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tainty. 17 The evidence will be sufficient if it affords the jury a reasonable
basis to conclude that the defendant's negligence "probably" or "more-
likely-than-not" was the "but for" cause of the harm."8 Where the evidence
shows only a possibility of causation, however, the court must direct a ver-
dict for the defendant. 19
In recent years, a growing line of cases, termed "loss of a chance" cases,
has put a strain on this traditional causation analysis.2" In a loss of a chance
case, a tortfeasor, through his negligence, causes an individual to lose a
chance to avoid some form of physical harm.21 To illustrate, suppose that
John Doe, who is experiencing severe bouts of coughing, visits his private
physician to determine the cause of his symptoms. 22 His physician refers
him to a radiologist, who x-rays Doe's chest and discovers Stage One can-
cer.23 Suppose further that the average Stage One patient possesses a statis-
tical forty percent chance of long-term survival.24 Through carelessness, an
individual on the radiologist's staff notifies Doe's private physician that the
x-rays were normal, and, as a consequence, the untreated cancer continues
to spread. Several months later, Doe's condition drastically worsens, and he
17. Id. § 41, at 269.
18. Id.
19. Id. See also Annot., 135 A.L.R. 516-29 (1941).
20. See infra notes 21-31 and accompanying text. See also King, Causation, Valuation,
and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Conse-
quences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353 (1981); Wolfstone & Wolfstone, Recovery of Damage for the Loss
of a Chance, 1982 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 121.
21. See, e.g., Gooding v. University Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 1984) (loss of
a chance to survive a heart attack); Cooper v. Sisters of Charity, Inc., 27 Ohio St. 2d 242, 272
N.E.2d 97 (1971) (loss of a chance to live). See also, e.g., Davis v. Graviss, 672 S.W.2d 928
(Ky. 1984) (loss of an accident victim's chance to avoid future complications, including menin-
gitis); Jordan v. Bero, 210 S.E.2d 618 (W. Va. 1974) (loss of a chance to avoid future injuries).
See generally cases cited infra note 29.
22. This hypothetical was generally patterned after James v. United States, 483 F. Supp.
581 (N.D. Cal. 1980). Some of the facts were modified, however, to give the reader a clearer
understanding of the impact of chances on tort litigation.
23. The American Joint Committee on Cancer has developed an intricate classification
system for cancer. See AMERICAN JOINT COMMITTEE ON CANCER, MANUAL FOR STAGING
OF CANCER (2d ed. 1983). The committee has set up the "TNM" progression, which focuses
on three general stages of the disease. Id. at 3. Stage One denotes the presence of a primary
tumor (T), Stage Two refers to regional lymph node involvement (N), while Stage Three de-
scribes distant metastasis (M) (spread of the disease to distant regions of the body). Id. at 6.
These stages have been further classified, a subject beyond the scope of this Comment. Id. at
6-8.
24. Cancer statistics are based on various "survival rates," which represent the length of
time victims have survived after a given date, whether it be the date of diagnosis or of the
beginning of treatment. Id. at 11. For most types of cancer, five-year studies are conducted.
In breast and prostate cancer cases, however, somewhat longer testing periods are necessary,
due to the risk of recurrence in the distant future. See generally id. at 11-21.
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again visits his physician. The cancer is finally rediscovered, but unfortu-
nately, it can no longer be treated. Doe's statistical chances of long-term
survival are practically nil. Several months later, he dies. His widow brings
a wrongful death action,25 alleging that the delay in diagnosis caused her
husband's death.26
At trial, expert testimony reveals that the radiologist was negligent in fail-
ing to communicate the correct findings to the patient's physician. 27
Although the evidence shows that the negligence decreased Doe's chances to
live by nearly forty percent, however, this is not enough to meet the "more-
likely-than-not" standard of proof.28 To satisfy the current standard of
25. Wrongful death and survival statutes have been in force for over a century. C. Mc-
CORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES §§ 93-94 (1935). For a brief discussion of
their provisions, see Coliseum Motor Co. v. Hester, 43 Wyo. 298, 3 P.2d 105 (1931). For a
thorough analysis of wrongful death statutes and survival actions, and an extensive exposition
of caselaw, see generally M. MINZER, J. NATES, C. KIMBALL, & D. AXELROD, DAMAGES IN
TORT ACTIONS ch. 29 (1984) [hereinafter cited as TORT ACTIONS]. For a further discussion of
their effect on loss of a chance cases, see infra notes 292-300 and accompanying text.
26. A plaintiff bringing a wrongful death action must allege that negligence caused the
patient's death. An allegation that a chance was lost does not fall within the traditional inter-
pretation of wrongful death statutes. See, e.g., Silvers v. Wesson, 122 Cal. App. 2d 902, 911,
266 P.2d 169, 175 (1954) (loss of a chance theory raised by counsel on appeal is "inconsistent
with the theory upon which the action was instituted and tried."); Herskovits v. Group Health
Cooperative, 99 Wash. 2d 609, 635 n. 1, 664 P.2d 474, 487 n. 1 (1983) (Pearson, J., concurring)
("The wrongful death statute is probably the principal reason the parties focused on the death
of Mr. Herskovits rather than on his diminished chance of survival."). See also infra notes
292-93 and accompanying text. But see Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative, 99 Wash. 2d
609, 635 n.1, 664 P.2d 474, 487 n.1 (1983) (Pearson, J., concurring) (language of the Washing-
ton State wrongful death statute sufficiently flexible to encompass recovery for loss of a less-
than-even chance).
27. This discussion will assume that the defendant has been found negligent (duty and
breach of that duty). There is a strong tendency, when discussing damages in negligence ac-
tions, and especially in a medical malpractice context, to drift into notions of culpability.
Nothing in this Comment, however, should be construed as arguing the validity of methods
currently used to determine whether a physician or other potential tortfeasor should be held
liable.
28. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B comment a, which states:
[1]n civil cases, the plaintiff is required to produce evidence that the conduct of the
defendant has been a substantial factor in bringing about the harm he has suffered,
and to sustain his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. This means
that he must make it appear that it is more likely than not that the conduct of the
defendant was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm. A mere possibility of
such causation is not enough; and when the matter remains one of pure speculation
and conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of
the court to direct a verdict for the defendant.
Id. (emphasis added). As an example of the operation of this rule, the Restatement gives the
following illustration:
While A is driving his automobile, his three-year-old child falls out of the car, and
lands on his head on the highway. Before A can stop his car and return to the child,
it is run over by B's negligently driven automobile. In A's action against B for the
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proof of causation, a "loss of a chance" plaintiff must show that the victim of
negligence probably would have survived had he been treated properly.2 9 If
the victim probably would not have survived, the cause of death was not the
negligence, but the preexisting cancer. To meet this standard, Doe's wife
must establish that, prior to the negligent act or omission, her husband pos-
sessed a chance of survival of at least fifty-one percent. Because the evidence
in Doe's case shows only a forty percent initial chance of survival, the court
will direct a verdict for the negligent defendant.3" The court will find that
the probable cause of death is the preexisting condition because, prior to the
defendant's negligence, the cancer had already decreased Doe's chances of
survival from one-hundred percent to forty percent. 3 '
It is readily apparent that under this approach, a slight variation in an
individual's initial chances of avoiding harm may produce very different out-
comes at trial. For example, if a victim has lost a chance of avoidance of
fifty-one percent or more, a jury will be permitted to find that the negligence
probably was the "but for" cause of the ultimate injury and award full dam-
ages.32 If another victim has lost a fifty percent chance or less, the great
death of the child, the evidence indicates that it is equally probable that the child was
killed immediately by the fall and was dead when it was run over, or that it was still
living, and was killed by B's car. On this evidence, A has not sustained his burden of
proof that the death was caused by B.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B comment a, illustration 2 (1965). See also cases
cited infra note 29.
29. See, e.g., Rewis v. United States, 503 F.2d 1202, 1204-05 (5th Cir. 1974), appeal after
remand, 536 F.2d 594 (1976); Bryant v. Rankin, 468 F.2d 510, 515 (8th Cir. 1972); McBride v.
United States, 462 F.2d 72, 75 (9th Cir. 1972); Wright v. United States, 507 F. Supp. 147, 157,
159 (E.D. La. 1981); Chester v. United States, 403 F. Supp. 458, 460 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Davis v.
Kemp, 252 Ark. 925, 927, 481 S.W.2d 712, 713 (1972); Morgenroth v. Pacific Medical Center,
Inc., 54 Cal. App. 3d 521, 532-33, 126 Cal. Rptr. 681, 688-89 (1976); Connellan v. Coffey, 122
Conn. 136, 138-41, 187 A. 901, 902-03 (1936); Gooding v. University Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445
So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 1984); Lazenby v. Beisel, 425 So. 2d 84, 86-87 (Fla. App. 1982); Speed v.
State, 240 N.W.2d 901, 906-07 (Iowa 1976); Walden v. Jones, 439 S.W.2d 571, 574-76 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1969); Harvey v. Silber, 300 Mich. 510, 520-21, 2 N.W.2d 483, 487 (1942); Cooper v.
Sisters of Charity, Inc., 27 Ohio St. 2d 242, 252-53, 272 N.E.2d 97, 103-04 (1971); Shapiro v.
Burkons, 62 Ohio App. 2d 73, 84-85, 404 N.E.2d 778, 784-85 (1978); Schenck v. Roger Wil-
liams Gen. Hosp., 119 R.I. 510, 514-15, 382 A.2d 514, 516-17 (1977); Hanselman v. McCar-
dle, 275 S.C. 46, 48-49, 267 S.E.2d 531, 533 (1980); Lee v. Andrews, 545 S.W.2d 238, 244
(Tex. Civ. App. 1976); O'Donoghue v. Riggs, 73 Wash. 2d 814, 824, 440 P.2d 823, 830 (1968);
Thornton v. CAMC, 305 S.E.2d 316, 324 (W. Va. 1983).
30. See, e.g., Cooper v. Sisters of Charity, 27 Ohio St. 2d 242, 272 N.E.2d 97 (1971).
31. Because of these probabilities, "[r]ecoverable damages, if any, would depend on the
extent to which it appeared that cancer killed the patient sooner than it would have with
timely diagnosis and treatment, and on the extent to which the delay in diagnosis aggravated
the patient's condition, such as by causing additional pain." King, supra note 20, at 1364.
32. See, e.g., Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative, 99 Wash. 2d at 633, 664 P.2d at
486 (Pearson, J., concurring).
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majority of courts would not allow the jury even to consider the evidence. 3
No prima facie case of causation would have been established because the
evidence indicated that the preexisting condition, rather than the negligence,
probably was the "but for" cause of the harm.3 4
The current approach naturally produces these "all-or-nothing" results on
the defendant's side as well. A defendant who caused another to lose a fifty
percent chance will face no liability.3 5 Conversely, a defendant who caused
someone to lose a fifty-one percent chance will face absolute liability,
although there was a forty-nine percent chance that the harm would have
occurred despite his negligence.3 6
To correct this disparate treatment, several courts have chosen to alter
proof requirements with regard to causation. Some courts have ruled that
because the defendant has made it impossible to determine what would have
happened in the absence of his negligence, the jury should be allowed to
consider any evidence indicating that a chance was lost, whether or not that
evidence demonstrates a probability that the harm could have been
avoided.3 7 Other courts have held that the plaintiff need only show that the
victim of negligence possessed a "substantial possibility" of survival.38
A growing number of commentators, however, have argued that altering
proof requirements fails to solve the inequity of the "all-or-nothing" ap-
proach.3 9 The solution to the problem, they have maintained, lies not in the
modification of causation principles, but rather in the redefinition of the
harm that the victim suffered.' In loss of a chance cases, the harm or injury
is not death or some other obvious harm. Rather, it is the loss of the chance
to avoid the harm or to achieve a positive outcome. 4 Under this analysis of
the negligence question, chances would fall into the "harm" category, rather
33. See Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp., Inc., 141 Ariz. 597, 606 & n.9, 688
P.2d 605, 614 & n.9 (1984); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 1, at 269; see also supra
note 28.
34. The traditional analysis thus produces "all-or-nothing" results, because a plaintiff will
recover "all" or "nothing," depending on the probabilities in a particular case. King, supra
note 20, at 1365.
35. See Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative, 99 Wash. 2d at 633, 664 P.2d at 486
(Pearson, J., concurring).
36. Id.
37. See infra notes 102-41 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 82-99 and accompanying text.
39. See generally King, supra note 20; Wolfstone & Wolfstone, supra note 20. See also
Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative, 99 Wash. 2d at 632, 664 P.2d at 486 (Pearson, J.,
concurring).
40. See King, supra note 20, at 1376.
41. Id.
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than under the causation element.4 2 For example, while the plaintiff may
not be able to prove that the defendant's negligence probably caused the
decedent's death, he is able to prove that it probably caused the decedent to
lose a chance to avoid the death.43 Under this model, damages parallel the
extent of the chance that the victim lost." These writers have argued that
this proportional analysis eliminates the extreme results generated by the
current approach.4 5 The loss of a forty percent chance produces a damages
award of forty percent of a full recovery, while the loss of an eighty percent
chance brings an eighty percent recovery.4 6
This Comment will examine the judicial treatment accorded the loss of a
chance in personal injury and wrongful death actions.47 It will maintain
that the failure of the courts to recognize that the loss of a chance is in itself
an injury has created a distorted and inequitable remedial system. It will
begin by considering the disparate analyses courts have used when address-
ing loss of a chance cases. The majority of cases cited involve medical mal-
practice. The loss of a chance problem, however, is present in other contexts
in which personal injuries or death occur.4" This Comment will also discuss
whether chances to live or to achieve better health should be recognized as
personal interests whose loss should give rise to an action for damages. It
will then consider several difficulties such an approach could present and
outline possible solutions. This Comment will conclude that chances are
valuable interests that should be protected by law. Damages awarded for the
loss of those interests should parallel the extent of the chance the victim has
lost.
I. THE LABYRINTH OF LOST CHANCES: How COURTS HAVE VIEWED
THE Loss OF A CHANCE DOCTRINE
Courts confronting a personal injury or wrongful death claim invariably
42. Id. See Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative, 99 Wash. 2d at 634, 664 P.2d at 487
(Pearson, J., concurring).
43. See King, supra note 20, at 1364.
44. Id. at 1382-84.
45. Id. at 1376.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 273-82.
47. Contract and products liability cases involving chances have been considered else-
where. See, e.g., Comment, Damages Contingent Upon Chance, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 875
(1964) (discussing the loss of a chance to benefit from a contract); Note, The Labor-Manage-
ment Relationship: Present Damages for Loss of Future Contracts, 71 YALE L.J. 563 (1962);
Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-in-Fact Rules for Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70
CALIF. L. REV. 881 (1982) (discussing the role of probabilities in products liability suits).
48. See, e.g., Davis v. Graviss, 672 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1984) (loss of a chance caused by the
negligence of a motor vehicle operator).
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focus on the overt harm suffered by the plaintiff.49 Then, they attempt to
determine whether that harm was "probably" caused by the defendant's neg-
ligence.5" If a case calls for an investigation into the victim's chances of
avoiding harm, courts generally require a medical expert to testify, with a
reasonable degree of medical certainty,5' that the victim probably would
have avoided the harm or achieved a better result but for the defendant's
negligence.5 2 If the testimony indicates that there was only a fifty percent or
lesser chance of avoidance or improvement, this probability is not estab-
lished, and the defendant prevails.
5 3
In Kuhn v. Banker,5 4 an early case decided by the Ohio Supreme Court,
the plaintiff claimed he had been injured as a result of the physician's failure
promptly to discover the disunion of the neck of his femur. A medical ex-
pert testified that, more likely than not, the harm would have ensued despite
prompt discovery.5 5 The court held that to prove causation, the plaintiff
must show that the injury probably could have been prevented with timely
treatment. 56 Because the expert was unable to testify that the harm proba-
49. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
50. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
51. The term "reasonable certainty" is used by some courts in reference to the certainty of
an expert witness's convictions concerning the substance of his testimony. See Kravinsky v.
Glover, 263 Pa. 8, 21, 396 A.2d 1349, 1355-56 (1979) (an expert may state that he is reason-
ably certain that the negligent act was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury). In
Boose v. Digate, 107 11. App. 2d 418, 246 N.E.2d 50 (1969), the Illinois Court of Appeals
asserted:
[W]hen a Doctor is asked to base his opinion on a reasonable degree of medical
certainty the certainty referred to is not that some condition in the future is certain to
exist or not to exist. Rather, the reasonable certainty refers to the general consensus
of recognized medical thought and opinion concerning the probabilities of conditions
in the future based on present conditions.
Id. at 423, 246 N.E.2d at 53. More commonly, the phrase "reasonable certainty" is used in
reference to the standard by which future consequences and damages in general must be
proved. See, e.g., Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 10, 21 (1968) (future pain and suffering); Annot., 18
A.L.R.3d 88, 97 (1968) (impairment of earning capacity).
52. See supra note 29.
53. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
54. 133 Ohio St. 304, 13 N.E.2d 242 (1938).
55. Id. at 308, 13 N.E.2d at 244.
56. Id. at 312, 13 N.E.2d at 245. The court commented that proof of causation is not
established by evidence of the percentage of recoveries achieved in similar cases. Id. Other-
wise, the court stated, a plaintiff who could show that 51% of similarly situated patients had
achieved a good result would prevail, while another, who could only demonstrate that 50% of
similarly situated individuals survived, would lose. Id. This aspect of the court's holding fails
to recognize that this is the usual method whereby causation in personal injury claims is estab-
lished. When a physician testifies about a patient's chances, he is basing that testimony either
on his own experience with patients or on the experiences of his colleagues, possibly supple-
mented by case studies and other medical literature. See Rosenberg, infra note 267. Ironi-
cally, when questioned about the possibility of recovery with proper treatment, the physician
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bly could have been prevented, the plaintiff did not meet his burden of
proof.57 The court emphasized that "[tlhe loss of [a] chance . . . standing
alone, is not an injury from which damages will flow." 58
A. Hicks v. United States: Raising False Hopes
For years, the reasoning in Kuhn v. Banker represented the standard by
which to evaluate causation in loss of a chance cases. Plaintiffs who could
not meet the standard of proof expressed in that decision had little hope of
ever receiving compensation for the loss of their opportunities for improved
life or health.59 Then, in 1966, a decision of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit appeared to provide new hope to these victims.
In Hicks v. United States,6" the administrator of a decedent's estate
brought suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act6 ' alleging that the patient's
death from an undiagnosed bowel obstruction had been caused by the de-
fendant's negligence. 62 The action was dismissed by the trial court, which
in Kuhn prefaced his answer by saying: "[I]t is our experience that .... " 133 Ohio St. at
308, 13 N.E.2d at 244 (emphasis added). Thus, the physician's testimony clearly indicated the
grounds for his knowledge. If he had testified that there was a probability of recovery, it
would have been because the majority of similarly situated patients he had observed had
survived.
57. 133 Ohio St. at 315, 13 N.E.2d at 247.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Connellan v. Coffey, 122 Conn. 136, 138-41, 187 A. 901, 902-03 (1936);
Harvey v. Silber, 300 Mich. 510, 520-21, 1 N.W.2d 483, 487 (1942); Paduchik v. Mikoff, 112
N.E.2d 69 (1951). But see Burk v. Foster, 114 Ky. 20, 69 S.W. 1096 (1902), where a patient
involved in a wagon accident was examined by a physician who negligently failed to discover a
dislocation of the humerus bone. When the dislocation was noticed three months later, treat-
ment could no longer be undertaken. Id. at 22, 69 S.W. at 1096. The plaintiff claimed that, as
a result of the negligence, the muscles in his arm had atrophied, and his arm had become
practically useless. Id. The defendant countered by asserting that the same outcome probably
would have resulted despite proper treatment. Id. at 24, 69 S.W. at 1097.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals, reversing the lower court, stated:
We think. . . the patient is entitled to the chance for the better results. . . . That
the patient might have [suffered the same outcome in spite of proper treatment, or
that 'ordinarily' bad results occur] is no excuse to the physician who neglects to give
his patient the benefit of the chance ....
Id. at 26, 69 S.W. at 1098.
In Craig v. Chambers, 17 Ohio St. 253, 254 (1867), a surgeon was accused of negligently
treating the patient's dislocated shoulder. The defendant argued that the plaintiff had not
proved that the negligence caused an injury. The Ohio Supreme Court explained that "any
[negligence] which diminishes the chances of the patient's recovery . . . would, in a legal
sense, constitute injury." Id. at 261. This passage, however, was thought by the Kuhn v.
Banker court to represent obiter dictum. Kuhn, 133 Ohio St. at 315, 13 N.E.2d at 246.
60. 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966).
61. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1982). The Act waives governmental immunity for
specified torts.
62. See supra note 27.
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accepted the government's argument that death would have ensued regard-
less of proper treatment.63 The plaintiff appealed, and the Fourth Circuit
reversed. 64 In what has become an oft-quoted passage, the Fourth Circuit
stated that "[w]hen a defendant's [negligence] has effectively terminated a
person's chance of survival," the defendant will not be allowed to "raise
conjectures as to the measure of the chances that he has put beyond the
possibility of realization.",65 If the defendant has destroyed a substantialpos-
sibility of survival, he will be liable for damages.66
The court then drew an analogy between a physician's failure properly to
treat a dying patient and admiralty law's "failure to rescue" doctrine, as
applied in Gardner v. National Bulk Carriers.6 7 In Gardner, a seaman failed
to report to his watchpost, prompting the crew to explore the vessel.61 Un-
fortunately, the effort proved unsuccessful. 69 The shipmaster was notified of
the seaman's disappearance, but made no attempt to search the waters
through which the vessel had just passed. 70 The district court heard con-
flicting testimony regarding the likelihood of rescue and the seaman's
chances of surviving a fall from the ship.71 It concluded that the plaintiff
had not met the burden of proving that a search probably would have saved
the crewman.72 The Fourth Circuit reversed,73 holding that the reasonable
possibility of rescue was enough to establish causation and that the shipmas-
ter's negligence contributed to the seaman's death.74
63. 368 F.2d at 628.
64. Id. at 633.
65. Hicks, 368 F.2d at 632.
66. Id. The meaning of th6 term "substantial possibility" is unclear. At least one com-
mentator believes that, under that standard, a plaintiff could recover for the loss of a chance of
less than 51%. See King, supra note 20, at 1368 n.52. The Hicks case did not resolve this
uncertainty. See infra note 77.
67. 310 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1962).
68. Id. at 285.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. There was expert testimony that, under the prevailing environmental conditions, a
man overboard could have survived and could have been saved by a search. Libellant's expert
testified that a search of the course traveled by the vessel between the time the crewman was
last seen and the time he was noticed missing "would probably have succeeded." Id. Respon-
dent's expert pointed out that the seaman was ill, and may have fainted and fallen overboard,
or may have attempted suicide. Id. at 286. Furthermore, there was speculation that one fall-
ing overboard would be sucked into the propeller, or would be attacked by sharks. Id. at 289
(Haynsworth, C.J., dissenting). It is clear, then, that the preponderance of the evidence did
not show that, more likely than not, the seaman would have been rescued.
72. Id. at 285. See Gardner, 190 F. Supp. 143, 146-47 (E.D. Va. 1960).
73. 310 F.2d at 288.
74. Id. at 287. The court went as far as to say that the failure to attempt a rescue, coupled
with a reasonable possibility of success, automatically imposes liability. Id.
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On the surface, Hicks' reference to Gardner implies that a person may
recover damages for the loss of a chance of fifty percent or less." The words
"substantial possibility" tend to denote a recognition of the value of these
chances.7 6 It is fairly clear, however, that the Hicks court did not intend
such a result." Hicks merely reemphasizes the traditional standard of proof
of causation. It makes it clear that causation is to be proved by a
probability, rather than by a certainty.7" Moreover, the causation analysis
focuses on the physical harm suffered. That analysis is not concerned with
lost chances other than in ascertaining whether the loss of these chances may
have resulted in the victim's death.79
Although Hicks merely restates the holding of Kuhn v. Banker, a sizeable
number of courts have been led astray by the court's reference to a "substan-
tial possibility."'s They have concluded that the Fourth Circuit, in Hicks,
intended to create a new standard of proof for plaintiffs who can only prove
75. See King, supra note 20, at 1369 n.53.
76. See supra note 66.
77. First, the administrator in Hicks, 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966), had established
through expert testimony that the decedent would have possessed at least a 75% chance of
survival had proper treatment been rendered. Id. at at 632. Thus, the loss of a chance was not
at issue in the case. Second, the court commented that a plaintiff in a medical malpractice
action need not prove "but for" causation to a certainty. Id. Some state courts apparently had
been applying a standard of proof that required "certain" proof of causation. See, e.g.,
Menarde v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 376 Pa. 497, 501, 103 A.2d 681, 684 (1954). See also
Hamil v. Bashline, 243 Pa. Super. 227, 235-36, 364 A.2d 1366, 1370 (1976), which seemed to
require an "actual certainty" showing of causation by the plaintiff. The holding was subse-
quently reversed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 481 Pa. 256, 273, 392 A.2d 1280, 1288-
89 (1978), which reinstituted, at least theoretically, the traditional more-likely-than-not test.
Although causation need not be proved to a certainty, the plaintiff still must show a
probability of "but-for" causation. 368 F.2d at 632. Third, the discussion in Hicks is followed
by a reference to Harvey v. Silber, 300 Mich. 510, 2 N.W.2d 483 (1942), which held that a
plaintiff's proof must show a probability of survival. See id. at 520, 2 N.W.2d at 487. Finally,
two years later, the court in Clark v. United States, 402 F.2d 950 (4th Cir. 1968), rejected the
argument that Hicks had altered causation principles to allow recovery for the loss of a chance.
In a footnote, the court explained that Hicks could not have established a new standard of
causation, because the case had been decided under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which directs
a federal court to apply state law in resolving disputes. Id. at 953 n.4.
78. See Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative, 99 Wash. 2d at 627, 664 P.2d at 483
(Pearson, J., concurring).
79. See King, supra note 20, at 1369 n.53.
80. Hicks, 368 F.2d at 632. Courts that both reject and advocate recovery for the loss of a
chance seem to have misconstrued the meaning of the Hicks case. See, e.g., Voegeli v. Lewis,
568 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1977); Daniels v. Hadley Memorial Hosp., 566 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir.
1977); McBride v. United States, 462 F.2d 72 (9th Cir. 1972); Jeanes v. Milner, 428 F.2d 598
(8th Cir. 1970); Wright v. United States, 507 F. Supp. 147 (E.D. La. 1981); Thomas v. Corso,
265 Md. 84, 288 A.2d 379 (1972); Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Hosp., 45 A.D.2d 177, 357
N.Y.S.2d 508, aff'd, 37 N.Y.2d 719, 337 N.E.2d 128, 374 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1974); Whitfield v.
Whittaker Memorial Hosp., 210 Va. 176, 169 S.E.2d 563 (1969); Herskovits v. Group Health
Cooperative, 99 Wash. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983). See also Hamil v. Bashline, 481 Pa. 256,
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that a "substantial possibility," or chance, of survival was destroyed."'
These courts have then attempted to apply this remedy for the "loss of a
substantial possibility," causing questionable results to be reached in the
process.
In Jeanes v. Milner,8 2 for example, a mother whose thirteen-year old son
died of throat cancer brought a malpractice action against a physician. She
claimed that the doctor had negligently delayed the transmission to a
pathologist of slides of the soft tissue of the boy's throat.8 3 Testimony at
trial indicated that during the delay, the lymphosarcoma (throat cancer)
progressed from Stage One to Stage Two.8 4 At Stage One, the survival rate
for this type of cancer stood at thirty-five percent, while at Stage Two, the
chance of survival decreased to twenty-four percent. The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas dismissed the action at the
close of plaintiffs case, concluding that a jury could not find "but for" cau-
sation from the loss of an eleven percent chance.85 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, 6 rejecting the assertion that a
jury verdict for the plaintiff could only be based upon speculation and con-
jecture.8 7 Applying Arkansas law, the court emphasized that a plaintiff is
not required to show causation to a mathematical certainty, or to exclude
every other possible hypothesis concerning the cause of death. 8 Where dif-
ferent conclusions could be drawn, the court wrote, it is the jury's task to
choose "what seems to [it] to be the most reasonable inference." 8 9
In Jeanes, the court held that a jury may conclude that the loss of an
eleven percent chance of survival caused the patient's death. The case, how-
ever, does not appear to stand for the proposition that the loss of a chance is
itself an injury worthy of redress.9° The injury for which the defendant
could be found liable was the boy's death. 9 '
392 A.2d 1280 (1978) (citing Hicks and Cooper v. Sisters of Charity, 27 Ohio St. 2d 242, 272
N.E.2d 97 (1971) (noting that its decision was in harmony with other judicial authority)).
81. See cases cited supra note 80.
82. 428 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1970).
83. Id. at 599.
84. Id. at 604.
85. Id. at 598.
86. Id. at 605.
87. Id. at 604.
88. Id. (citing Lanier v. Trammell, 207 Ark. 372, 180 S.W.2d 818 (1944)).
89. Id. (quoting Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653 (1946)).
90. Several judges of the Washington Supreme Court, however, believe that Jeanes pro-
vides compensation for lost chances. See Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative, 99 Wash.
2d at 631-32, 664 P.2d at 485 (Pearson, J., concurring) (Jeanes holds that lost chances, rather
than death, are the injury).
91. It is difficult to understand, from a logical standpoint, how a jury applying a tradi-
tional causation analysis could arrive at the requisite conclusion. While the loss of an 11%
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In Thomas v. Corso,92 the plaintiff, who had been struck by an automobile,
was taken to a hospital emergency room.9 3 A nurse recorded the patient's
vital signs and contacted the defendant, an "on-call" physician.94 The phy-
sician did not believe that the patient's condition required his personal obser-
vation. 95 Subsequently, the patient was transferred from the emergency
room to another ward, where he died several hours later of massive internal
bleeding.9 6 The plaintiff prevailed at trial. On appeal, the defendant-physi-
cian urged the Court of Appeals to reverse, maintaining that the medical
testimony had shown that even with timely treatment, the patient had pos-
sessed only a possibility of survival. 97 Relying on Hicks, the Maryland
Court of Appeals held that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find
that a "substantial possibility of survival" had been lost because of the de-
fendant's negligence.
98
It is difficult to determine from the court's opinion whether it intended a
substantial possibility to mean a probability. It seems clear, however, that
the loss of a chance was not viewed as the compensable injury. Death was
still considered the injury, but the jury could now find that the defendant
caused the death if he destroyed a "substantial possibility" of survival.99
B. Hamil v. Bashline: A New Test for Plaintiffs
The Jeanes and Thomas decisions present a departure from traditional
proof requirements applicable in negligence actions."° Another group of
courts has fashioned a rule which, although purporting to retain the "more-
likely-than-not" requirement, actually distorts the standard of proof of cau-
sation."° ' The Pennsylvania case of Hamil v. Bashline °2 established this
chance may have caused the patient's death, it would appear to be impossible for a jury to
determine that the death was caused by the chance lost through the defendant's negligence
rather than by the chance lost on account of the preexisting condition. For example, suppose a
preexisting condition diminished a patient's chances by 70%, leaving the patient with a 30%
chance. Subsequently, the defendant's negligence reduces the 30% chance to 19%. A jury,
under these facts, possesses no evidence from which it can conclude that the defendant's negli-
gence was a substantial factor in causing the patient's death.
92. 265 Md. 84, 288 A.2d 379 (1972).
93. Id. at 87, 288 A.2d at 382.
94. Id. at 88, 288 A.2d at 383.
95. Id. at 97-101, 288 A.2d at 387-89. The patient, Corso, had sustained a leg fracture.
The nurse had informed Dr. Thomas that the patient had been struck by an automobile. Id. at
88, 288 A.2d at 383.
96. Id. at 90, 288 A.2d at 384.
97. Id. at 94, 288 A.2d at 386.
98. Id. at 102, 288 A.2d at 390.
99. See King, supra note 20, at 1368 n.53.
100. See supra notes 82-99.
101. See, e.g., Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 597, 688 P.2d 605
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new trend. In Hamil, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court approved of a Penn-
sylvania Superior Court's resort to section 323(a) of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts1 3 in relaxing the threshold of proof required to make out a
prima facie case of causation. 1°
Hamil was a malpractice case in which a patient, Hamil, was taken by his
wife to an emergency room after he complained of severe chest pains. 10 5 A
physician ordered an electrocardiogram (EKG), but the EKG machine did
not function and the test could not be performed. 0 6 The physician in-
structed the staff to obtain another machine, and thereupon left the hospital.
When no machine could be located, and after her husband was offered no
other treatment or assistance, the patient's wife took him to a private physi-
cian. 1o' The patient subsequently died of a heart attack in the private physi-
cian's office, during the performance of an EKG.
108
At trial, one expert testified that if proper treatment had been rendered by
the hospital, the patient would have had a seventy-five percent chance of
surviving the heart attack he had suffered.109 The defendant's expert dis-
agreed, insisting that at the time of the patient's arrival at the hospital, death
was imminent and inevitable regardless of any treatment."11 The trial court
directed a verdict for the defendant, finding that the expert testimony had
not shown causation to a sufficient degree of certainty."'
On appeal, the Superior Court held that under section 323(a) of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, a prima facie case of causation had been
presented.1 12 It therefore reversed the lower court's ruling, and granted a
(Ariz. 1984); Evers v. Dollinger, 95 N.J. 399, 471 A.2d 405 (1984); Jones v. Montefiore Hosp.,
494 Pa. 410, 431 A.2d 920 (1981); Gradel v. Inouye, 491 Pa. 534, 421 A.2d 674 (1980); Her-
skovits v. Group Health Cooperative, 99 Wash. 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983).
102. 481 Pa. 256, 392 A.2d 1280 (1978).
103. Section 323(a) provides:
Negligent Performance of Undertaking to Render Services
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to an-
other which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's person
or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his
failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if: (a) his failure to
exercise such care increases the risk of such harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323(a) (1965).
104. Hamil, 481 Pa. at 277, 392 A.2d at 1287-88.
105. 481 Pa. at 262, 392 A.2d at 1283.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 262-63, 392 A.2d at 1283.
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new trial.113 On retrial, a jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant-
hospital.
Reviewing the case on appeal, the Supreme Court granted the plaintiff a
third trial, and held that the trial court's instruction regarding causation had
been misleading.114 The court then turned to the issue of what expert testi-
mony was required in order for the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of
causation.' 15 It began by explaining that most tort actions allege that the
defendant unleashed a dangerous force that injured the plaintiff.116 This
case, however, involved a situation, recognized in section 323(a) of the Re-
statement, where the defendant failed to protect the plaintiff from another
harmful source, namely, the preexisting heart trouble.11 7
Ruling that this factual difference warranted a deviation from normal
proof requirements, the court then set up a two-part analysis for the trial
court to follow on remand.' 1 8 The trial court initially was to determine
whether the defendant's negligence increased the patient's chances of dy-
ing.' 19 If the negligence increased those chances, the jury would then be
required to evaluate the increased risk and to decide whether the increase
was a "substantial factor" in producing the death.' 2 ° If the jury found that
it was a substantial factor, causation would be established.
Under the new test, the court wrote, negligence must still have been a
substantial factor in producing the death. 12 However, the jury, rather than
the medical expert, must make the determination of causation, based on its
evaluation of the increased risk. 122 In situations falling under section 323(a),
therefore, expert testimony would only be needed to show the extent of the
increased risk of harm. 123 A jury, given the evidence of the increased risk,
would be as qualified as an expert to determine what might have happened in
the absence of negligence. '
24
113. Id.
114. Id. at 275, 392 A.2d at 1289-90. The lower court's instruction had implied that in
order for the plaintiff to prevail, he must show that the defendant's negligence was the sole
cause of the harm, rather than a substantial factor in producing the harm. Id. at 274 n. 13, 392
A.2d at 1289 n.13.
115. Id. at 266, 392 A.2d at 1285.





121. Id. at 272, 392 A.2d at 1288.
122. Id. at 273, 392 A.2d at 1288.
123. Id.
124. The court cited RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B (1965) in support of this
holding. 481 Pa. 271, 392 A.2d 1287. In § 433B comment b, the Restatement gives the exam-
ple of a child who drowned in an unguarded pool. The Restatement noted that because "the
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A recent case applying the Hamil reasoning is Herskovits v. Group Health
Cooperative.125 In Herskovits, an expert testified that as a result of a delay in
diagnosis of the decedent's lung cancer, the patient's chances of survival de-
creased from approximately thirty-nine percent to twenty-five percent.1 26 In
its opinion, the majority conceded that the plaintiff's expert was unable to
testify that "more-likely-than-not," the delay had caused the patient's
death. 127 Nevertheless, it held that the jury could find that the reduction of
the patient's chances of survival from thirty-nine percent to twenty-five per-
cent caused the patient's death. 128 The court ruled that under section 323(a)
of the Restatement, once the plaintiff has introduced evidence that the de-
fendant's negligence increased the risk of harm, the jury may "go further
and find that such increased risk was in turn a substantial factor in bringing
about the resultant harm."'
129
In Thompson v. Sun City Community Hospital, 131 the Supreme Court of
Arizona followed Hamil's lead. In Thompson, a patient arrived at a private
hospital with a leg injury, but because the patient's insurance coverage was
inadequate, he was transferred to another hospital for treatment.13 1 When
common experience of the community permits the conclusion that [a] guard would more prob-
ably than not have [saved the boy]," such cases should be submitted to the jury. Id. By
analogy, in Hamil, a physician's testimony that the decedent would have possessed a chance of
survival of 75% permits the jury to conclude that the decedent, with proper care, probably
would have been saved.
125. 99 Wash. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983).
126. Id. at 612, 664 P.2d at 475.
127. Id. at 611-12, 664 P.2d at 475.
128. Id. at 614, 664 P.2d at 476-77.
129. Id. at 617, 664 P.2d at 478 (citing Hamil v. Bashline, 481 Pa. 256, 392 A.2d 1280
(1978)). Superficially, use of the substantial factor test in this context would appear logical,
given that loss of a chance cases involve multiple causes. Unlike the traditional substantial
factor model, however, it cannot be said that both causes would have been "but for" causes of
the harm. As one commentator observed, use of the substantial factor test in this context is
"truly novel." Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative, 99 Wash. 2d at 638, 664 P.2d at 489
(Brachtenbach, J., dissenting). Justice Brachtenbach remarked that except where two forces
are coequal causes of the harm, "the defendant's act cannot be a substantial factor when the
event would have occurred without it." Id.
The Hamil reasoning was also applied in Evers v. Dollinger, 95 N.J. 399, 471 A.2d 405
(1984). Evers involved a delay in the diagnosis of breast cancer. One of plaintiff's experts
claimed that because of the delay, the plaintiff faced a 25% statistical risk of recurrence. 95
N.J. at 404-05, 471 A.2d at 408. The cancer, in fact, recurred prior to trial. Id. at 403-04, 471
A.2d at 407-08. The Supreme Court of New Jersey first held that § 323(a) of the Restatement
applied to medical malpractice actions. Id. at 417, 471 A.2d at 415. It then cited its approval
of the Hamil holding. Id. It premised its approval, however, on the fact that the patient's
cancer had recurred. The court declined to address the question whether the risk of recur-
rence, standing alone, represents an actionable injury. Id. at 406, 412 n.7, 471 A.2d at 409, 412
n.7.
130. 141 Ariz. 597, 688 P.2d 605 (1984).
131. Id. at 600, 688 P.2d at 608.
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the patient suffered residual leg impairment, his mother filed suit, alleging
that the delay in treatment resulting from the transfer had increased her
son's risk of suffering such impairment.132
At trial, the defendant's experts testified that even absent negligent treat-
ment, the patient possessed only a five to ten percent chance of complete
recovery with proper treatment. 133 The plaintiffs expert did not quantify
the extent of the lost chance, but testified that the patient's chances would
have been "substantially better" with proper treatment.1 3' The plaintiff re-
quested that the jury be instructed that a recovery could be based upon evi-
dence that the defendant increased the risk of harm.1 35  The trial court
instead instructed the jury that the plaintiff could not recover absent proof
that the defendant's negligence probably aggravated the injury.136 When the
jury found for the hospital, the plaintiff appealed, seeking adoption of the
requested instruction.
3 7
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona concluded that in order to pro-
tect the "chance interest," the jury should be allowed to decide whether the
loss of the five to ten percent chance probably caused the injury.1 38 The
court held that the jury must still find that the negligence probably caused
the harm. 139 The jury, however, would now be allowed to consider the evi-
dence of the lost chance in determining whether that probability had been
established. "4
The court acknowledged that the rule "permits the jury to engage in some
speculation with regard to cause and effect," but it was quick to add that it
was the defendant's negligence that had created the need for speculation. 41
Because of this, the court wrote, the jury should be allowed to find causation
132. Id.
133. Id. at 607, 688 P.2d at 615.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 605, 688 P.2d at 613.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 601, 688 P.2d at 609.
138. Id. at 608, 688 P.2d at 616.
139. Id.
140. If the court desired to protect the chance interest, however, it should have dispensed
entirely with an examination of whether the negligence probably caused the death. Under the
court's analysis, the jury would only be permitted to protect the chance interest when it found
that the lost chance was sufficiently significant to have been the probable cause of death. Any
chance that "probably" did not cause death would still go uncompensated, and consequently,
unprotected. See infra note 233.
141. 141 Ariz. at 607-08, 688 P.2d at 615-16. This argument failed to convince at least two
judges of the Washington Supreme Court. In his dissent in Herskovits v. Group Health Coop-
erative, 99 Wash. 2d at 609, 637-38, 664 P.2d at 474, 488, Justice Brachtenbach, joined by
Justice Dimmick, cautioned that "[m]alpractice suits represent a class of controversies where
extreme caution should be exercised in relaxing causation requirements." Id.
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under "any plausible theory."' 142 The court further noted that its new for-
mulation merely recognized that juries often reduce damages to reflect accu-
rately the extent of the plaintiff's lOSS.
14 3
C. Cooper v. Sisters of Charity, Inc.: Reaffirming the Majority Rule
The meandering analyses advanced by courts attempting to circumvent
the traditional standard of proof were sharply criticized in Cooper v. Sisters
of Charity, Inc. " In Cooper, a young boy who had been hit by a truck was
taken to a hospital and treated. The boy subsequently died.145 The plaintiff
argued that the hospital failed to perform certain crucial tests, and that, as a
result, a necessary surgical procedure was not performed. Had it been per-
formed, the plaintiff argued, the boy's life would have been saved. The court
heard conflicting testimony from two medical experts. One physician testi-
fied that there was no way to determine whether the patient would have
survived had the surgery been performed.' 46 Another expert indicated that
with surgery, the patient may have had a fifty percent chance of survival. ,4
The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed a directed verdict for the defend-
ant,'4 8 holding that a plaintiff must prove that the defendant's negligence
"more-likely-than-not" caused the patient's injury."' The court acknowl-
edged that it was tempting, in malpractice situations, to rely on relaxed stan-
dards of proof, because life itself is often at stake.' 50 Citing Hicks, the court
remarked that human emotions compel the view that the loss of any chance
of survival should render the death compensable. 5 ' The court denied recov-
ery, however, fearing that such a rule would be so "loose" that it would be
unjust. 112
142. 141 Ariz. at 608, 688 P.2d at 616.
143. Id. See Orloff & Stedinger, infra note 249.
144. 27 Ohio St. 2d 242, 272 N.E.2d 97 (1971).
145. Id. at 244, 272 N.E.2d at 98-99.
146. Id. at 252, 272 N.E.2d at 104.
147. Id. at 252-53, 272 N.E.2d at 104.
148. Id. at 242, 272 N.E.2d at 97.
149. Id. at 251, 272 N.E.2d at 103.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 252-53, 272 N.E.2d at 103. This represents yet another example of a misreading
of the Hicks case. For other examples, see supra note 77 and accompanying text.
152. 27 Ohio St. 2d at 252, 272 N.E.2d at 103. In Hiser v. Randolph, 126 Ariz. 608, 617
P.2d 774 (1980), a diabetic patient was taken to a county hospital in a semicomatose state.
Upon the patient's arrival, the nurse in charge of the emergency room immediately contacted
the "on-call" physician. 126 Ariz. at 609, 617 P.2d at 775. When the "on-call" physician, Dr.
Randolph, was informed that the patient was Mrs. Hiser, he stated that the nurse should call
Mrs. Hiser's private physician, Dr. Arnold. Id. The nurse complied, but Dr. Arnold likewise
refused to attend to the patient, stating that it was the duty of the on-call physician to render
aid to emergency patients. Id. Dr. Randolph was again contacted, and again refused to see
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The Supreme Court of Florida recently adopted Cooper's reasoning in
Gooding v. University Hospital Bldg., Inc. 153 In Gooding, a patient was taken
to the emergency room of a Florida hospital, where he was left untreated by
the hospital staff, which believed that the patient's private physician would
soon arrive to examine the patient.154 When the doctor finally reached the
hospital, the patient went into cardiac arrest and forty-five minutes later, he
died. 155
At trial, the plaintiff established that the inaction of the emergency room
staff constituted negligence. 5 6 However, no expert testified that had the pa-
tient been properly treated, he probably would have survived.15 7 Neverthe-
less, the trial court instructed the jury that if it found that the negligence
destroyed a significant chance of survival, it could return a verdict for the
plaintiff. 5 8 The jury found the hospital liable, and awarded $300,000 in
damages to Gooding's estate. The district court reversed, ruling that if
Gooding's chances of survival were at most fifty percent, a verdict must be
the patient. In desperation, the nurse called the hospital's Chief of Staff, Dr. Lingenfelter, who
came to the hospital and immediately began conducting tests and initiating treatment. Id.
Unfortunately, Mrs. Hiser died the next morning. An expert testified that Mrs. Hiser would
have possessed a "substantial chance" of survival if prompt treatment had been rendered. Id.
at 610, 617 P.2d at 776. The expert acknowledged that it was impossible to assert categorically
that Mrs. Hiser would have lived, but he maintained that any delay "would substantially in-
crease the risk of death." Id. Citing Cooper v. Sisters of Charity, and rejecting Hicks and
Hamil, the Arizona court reaffirmed its existing standard of proof, holding that the malprac-
tice must have been the probable, and not merely a possible, cause of the death. 126 Ariz. at
612-13, 617 P.2d at 778-79 (Hiser was recently overruled in Thompson v. Sun City Commu-
nity Hosp., 141 Ariz. 597, 688 P.2d 605 (1984)).
In Morgenroth v. Pacific Med. Ctr., Inc., 54 Cal. App. 3d 521, 126 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1976), a
California court relied on Cooper in ruling that a showing of a possibility will not establish
causation. It held that there must be testimony indicating that the defendant's negligence
probably caused the patient's death. Id. at 533, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 688.
153. 445 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 1984).




158. The trial court instructed the jury:
Negligence is a legal cause of death and damages if it directly and in natural and
continuous sequence produces or contributes substantially to producing such death,
so that it can reasonably be said that, but for the negligence, the death would not
have occurred. If you find that Hagood Gooding had a significant chance of survival
and if you find that negligence on the part of the defendant, its agents or servants,
destroyed Mr. Gooding's chances for survival, then the negligence of that defendant or
defendants-is a legal cause of injury.
Id. (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court of Florida believed that this language would allow causation to be estab-
lished by evidence showing the "possibility" of a link between the negligence and the patient's
death. Id. at 1017 n.l.
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directed in favor of the defendant." 9
The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed,' 6° citing Cooper.1 6 ' The court
alluded to a "perceived unfairness" facing plaintiffs who could prove a possi-
bility rather than a probability of causation,1 62 but stressed two arguments
indicating why causation should not be satisfied by a lesser standard of
proof. First, the court remarked that health care providers could be placed
in the position of having to defend cases "simply because a patient fails to
improve or where serious disease processes are not arrested because another
course of action could possibly bring a better result." 163 Second, the court
noted that no other professional malpractice defendant must defend against
this lower standard.164
II. Do CHANCES POSSESS VALUE?
A. A Visceral Answer
The current causation approach requires the finder of fact to determine
whether the decedent's chances to live or to achieve a more favorable result
were more probable than not.1 65 Once the evidence shows that a probability
did or did not exist, the inquiry ends.166 As a result, chances of less than
fifty-one percent are treated as if they were nonexistent. A more sensible
159. University Hosp. Bldg., Inc. v. Gooding, 419 So. 2d 1111, 1115 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982). The district court noted that its decision was in conflict with two other district court
opinions. Id. at 1114. In Hernandez v. Clinica Pasteur, Inc., 293 So. 2d 747 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1974), a Florida court held that evidence that the decedent would have had a "better"
chance to survive with prompt medical attention was enough to allow the jury to consider the
causation question. Id. In Dawson v. Weems, 352 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977), the
court ruled that a hospital's administration of blood from a blood bank, rather than from a
fresh source, deprived the patient of his "best chance" to survive, and presented evidence from
which a jury could find causation. 352 So. 2d at 1203. Acknowledging the conflict among the
districts, the Gooding court certified the causation question to the Florida Supreme Court.
University Hosp. Bldg., Inc. v. Gooding, 419 So. 2d at 1114-15.
160. 445 So. 2d at 1020-21.
161. Id. at 1020.
162. Id. at 1019.
163. Id. at 1019-20. This argument fails to realize that many suits are brought each year
simply because a patient experienced a poor result, or because the family believed that other
measures should have been taken to protect a loved one.
164. Id. at 1020. The court cited Freeman v. Rubin, 318 So. 2d 540 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975), which held that a plaintiff alleging legal malpractice must show that "but for" the
attorney's negligence, recovery could have been obtained in the underlying suit. 318 So. 2d at
543. To rationalize use of the traditional test by noting that it is used in other contexts, how-
ever, does not address the real question-that concerning the rule's validity.
165. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B comment a (1965).
166. See Comment, supra note 47, at 885 (courts apply the probability standard because of
ease of application, but fail "to take the logical step of proportioning damages to that
probability").
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approach would be to redefine the victim's injury as the loss of a chance.
Instead of attempting to determine whether the physical harm was caused by
negligence, a court could examine the extent of the victim's lost chances for
cure or improvement and grant a recovery that mirrors the extent of those
chances.167 When viewing the question in the negligence setting, the harm
suffered would be the loss of the chance.' 6 ' The relevant inquiry would be
whether the defendant "probably" caused a reduction in the victim's
chances. If causation were found, the court would provide compensation for
the lost chance in direct proportion to the extent of the lost chance.
169
Several American courts and commentators have viewed chances as inter-
ests worthy of protection in their own right. '70 In James v. United States,I7I
a plaintiff complained that the defendant negligently failed to inform him
that an abnormality had been discovered by a radiologist during a preem-
ployment physical.' 72 Through a clerical error, the x-ray and the radiolo-
gist's report were refiled without having been seen by the treating
physician.' 7 3 As a result, the abnormality, which was lung cancer, went un-
treated for almost two years.' 74 When James's symptoms worsened, he
sought help from his personal physician.' 75 X-rays revealed a large mass in
James's right lung, but by this time the cancer could not be surgically re-
moved.' 76 The plaintiff was treated with radiation, which successfully
placed the disease in remission. '77
At trial, experts testified that even with proper treatment, James's chances
of long-term survival were slight.' 7 ' Despite this testimony, the court held
that the plaintiff had shown that timely diagnosis and treatment "would
have offered at least a chance" to successfully arrest, if not cure, the tu-
167. See text accompanying notes 273-82.
168. King, supra note 20, at 1363-64.
169. See text accompanying notes 273-82.
170. See cases cited supra note 59. See also King, supra note 20; Wolfstone, supra note 20.
Legal literature has paid little attention to the place of chances in personal injury actions. For
one discussion of proportionate recovery in mass tort litigation, see Delgado, supra note 47.
Commentators, discussing lost chances in a contract setting rather than a tort setting, have
generally favored awarding proportionate recovery. See infra notes 201-09 and accompanying
text.
171. 483 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
172. 483 F. Supp. at 584.




177. Id. Because the patient had not yet died, the court was forced either to acknowledge
the value of chances or dismiss the case. See supra note 129 (discussing Evers v. Dollinger, 95
N.J. 399, 471 A.2d 405 (1984)) and infra notes 301-05 and accompanying text.
178. 483 F. Supp. at 585-86.
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mor.179 The court then added that "[n]o matter how small that chance may
have been. . . no one can say that the chance of prolonging one's life. . . is
valueless." ' The court awarded damages of $35,000 for the chance
element. 1 1
In O'Brien v. Stover,182 the defendant, who had negligently treated a can-
cer patient, claimed at trial that the decedent would have died regardless of
the negligence.1 13 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit found that the cancer O'Brien suffered from carried an overall thirty
percent chance of survival. 184 The court held that the loss of the chance
should be redressed. 8 5 A verdict of $50,000 was upheld on appeal.186
The concurring opinion of Judge Pearson, in Herskovits v. Group Health
Cooperative,187 maintained that "[the] loss of a. . . chance [should be recog-
nized] as an actionable injury." ' 8 Judge Pearson rejected the notion, enun-
ciated in the majority opinion and in Hamil v. Bashline,189 that causation of
death could be shown by proof of the loss of a chance of less than fifty-one
percent.1 90 The injury that could be proved by a probability is the loss of the
chance of survival. 91 The opinion demonstrates the clearest judicial under-
standing to date of the notion of recovery for loss of a chance. It should be
referred to by other courts desiring to provide their jurisdictions with a more
rational framework in which to evaluate damages for loss of a chance in
personal injury and wrongful death actions.' 92
B. The Hypothetical Market Theory
The James and O'Brien decisions, as well as the concurring opinion in
179. Id. at 587.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 587.
182. 443 F.2d 1013 (8th Cir. 1971).
183. Id. at 1017-18.
184. Id. at 1018.
185. Id. The patient's chances of survival, however, were probably greater than 30%. The
court found that although the overall chances of survival of the group of patients suffering
from this type of cancer stood at 30%, this patient's tumor probably had not progressed as far
as the tumors of other patients in the group. Id.
186. Id.
187. 99 Wash. 2d at 619, 664 P.2d at 479.
188. Id. at 634, 664 P.2d at 487. See Jordan v. Bero, 210 S.E.2d 618, 640-41 (W. Va. 1974)
(Neely, J., concurring).
189. 481 Pa. 256, 392 A.2d 1280 (1978).
190. 99 Wash. 2d at 624, 664 P.2d at 481.
191. For a brief discussion of the concurrence's theory, see W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
supra note 1, at 272.
192. The one potential flaw of the opinion lies in its treatment of the wrongful death issue.
See infra notes 294-97 and accompanying text.
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Herskovits, rest on the unwritten premise that chances possess value in their
own right, and that loss of such value merits redress. One of the first deci-
sions attempting to articulate a rationale for this conclusion was the English
case of Chaplin v. Hicks.'9 3 In Chaplin, a young woman had been selected
by newspaper readers from a field of 6000 hopefuls to be one of 50 semifinal-
ists in a beauty contest. The fifty contestants were then asked to appear
personally before the defendant, who would choose the twelve women he
considered to be the most attractive. Of the twelve winners, four would win
first prize, four would take second place, and four would place third. The
prizes consisted of three-year acting contracts of differing salaries. Unfortu-
nately, the defendant failed to notify the plaintiff of her selection as a semi-
finalist, and as a result she failed to appear for the final evaluation.' 9 4 The
plaintiff brought suit, and the jury returned a verdict in her favor, awarding
her approximately 1/19th of the total value of the prizes.1 9 5 The Court of
Appeal affirmed, 19 6 holding that chances to win represent compensable in-
terests. In his opinion, Lord Justice Williams espoused a "hypothetical mar-
ket theory" by remarking that "a jury might well take the view that such a
right, if it could have been transferred, would have been of such a value that
193. [1911] 2 K.B. 786 (C.A.). Although the case addressed the loss of a chance in a
contract setting rather than in a tort setting, its reasoning is equally relevant in the latter
context.
At least one American contract case seems to suggest that a lost chance, standing alone,
should be compensated. In Kansas City M. & 0. Ry. v. Bell, 197 S.W. 322 (Tex. Civ. App.
1917), a hog breeder alleged that had his hogs been shipped to a stock show on time, he would
have won first, rather than second, prize. The court remarked:
The chance might be worth little or nothing, or it might be worth, under some
circumstances, the full amount of the premium offered for the best of the class in
which plaintiff was to be a competitor. In such a case, evidence as to all such matters
as would tend to show the probability that the plaintiff would be successful in the
competition would be admissible, and . . . it would then be left to the good sense of
the jury trying the case to determine the value of the plaintiff's chance in the
competition.
Id. at 323.
Commentators disagree, however, as to the court's meaning. Professor McCormick, in his
treatise on damages, states that the Bell court viewed lost chances as compensable injuries. C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 26, at 122 n.83 (1935). Professor Dobbs does not subscribe to that
interpretation. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.3, at 156 n.35 (1973).
194. 2 K.B. at 788.
195. Miss Chaplin, the plaintiff, was awarded £100 out of a total purse of£1872. See Com-
ment, supra note 47, at 880. The jury's award undoubtedly resulted from its subjective evalua-
tion of Miss Chaplin's likelihood of winning a prize, as it does not exactly correspond to the
one in 12 statistical probability of winning. This calculation probably represents an applica-
tion of the "personalistic" method of estimating probabilities. This theory assesses probabili-
ties by reference to the finder of fact's confidence in a particular proposition. For further
explanation of this theory, see Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN.
L. REV. 1065, 1066-67 (1968).
196. [1911] 2 K.B. 786 (C.A.).
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everyone would recognize that a good price could be obtained for it."''
Mange v. Unicorn Press19 8 is another case in which the "hypothetical mar-
ket theory" was used to allow recovery. In Mange, the plaintiff lost a chance
to be one of 23,548 contestants to compete for 210 prizes, with a grand prize
of $307,500. The court rejected the argument that damages would be too
speculative to merit compensation and held that the plaintiff's chances of
success would have had some market value.' 9 9
Several American commentators have written favorably about the market
theory of damages.2°° Professor Dobbs has noted that although some
hoped-for gains are too uncertain to warrant full recovery, a value can be
201erplaced on the chance or opportunity to achieve the gains. In cases where
the value of a chance is difficult to estimate, a court could hear evidence of
the value that a market buyer or trader would be willing to give for the
opportunity to achieve the gain.20 2 For example, if A bought the chance
(ticket) to win a bingo prize, but through B's negligence was prevented from
attempting to win the prize, A would be unable to establish that she probably
would have won the prize. She could prove, however, that she lost a chance
to win, and attempt to establish the market value of the negligently inflicted
loss of that chance.20 3
Professor Malone, in his well-known essay on causation,2 remarks on
cases presenting difficulties of proof for the plaintiff. Malone proposes that
where such chances can be reduced to a market value, they should be recog-
nized as interests in their own right.20 5 Rather than deny recovery, Malone
197. Id.
198. 129 F. Supp. 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
199. Id. at 730.
200. The commentators addressed the loss of a chance theory in the contract setting. How-
ever, as it is stated in Note and Comment, infra note 213, there is less basis for denying recov-
ery for the loss of a chance in tort cases since, contrary to contract cases, contemplation of the
parties is immaterial.
201. D. DOBBS, supra note 193, § 3.3, at 155. Professor Dobbs later addressed the value of
chances in personal injury actions. See Note, infra note 243.,
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60 (1956).
205. Id. at 80. Malone remarks that troublesome causation questions could be resolved by
shifting the focus from the overt harm to chances. Id. He cited the case of Valentine v. Min-
neapolis St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 155 Mich. 151, 118 N.W. 970 (1908), where the court stated
that "even though the plaintiff's chance... was. . . 'a gambler's chance,' he had a right to
take it, and the defendant had no right to destroy such chance .... " 155 Mich. at 158-59,
118 N.W. at 974. Malone believes that courts often grant or deny recovery for lost chances
based on the various policy thrusts involved in a given situation. Where an intentional
tortfeasor causes harm, lost chances may occasionally be redressed. Interestingly, Malone
states:
[w]here the policy thrust of the rule violated by defendant is short and timid, as in a
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contends that courts should make an adjustment in damages awarded.2 °6
Professor Schaefer also argues that where a lost opportunity to achieve a
gain has a market value, concomitant damages should be awarded.20 7
Schaefer maintains that any chance has a hypothetical market value. 208 He
notes, however, that courts have been loathe to extend this principle to non-
contest situations. This judicial hesitancy exists despite the fact that such an
approach would prevent undercompensation of plaintiffs where their losses
were uncertain and would prevent overcompensation of plaintiffs by award-
ing them less than would be awarded under the traditional "all-or-nothing"
approach.20 9
As early as 1867, an Ohio court held that the loss of a chance of recovery
constituted a legally recognizable injury.21" Despite this auspicious begin-
ning, subsequent judicial decisions have refused to treat the loss of a chance
as a compensable injury. One must ask, therefore, whether the economic
argument somehow falls short in the realm of personal injury.
A hypothetical question may provide the answer: If a thirty percent
chance to live could be purchased in a market, would a patient having no
chance to live be willing to buy the thirty percent chance? Or, would he
reason that his life was not valuable enough to risk buying a chance of less
than fifty-one percent? The answer may depend on one's appetite for life,
malpractice suit where a physician is charged with an error of diagnosis or treatment,
the court will not permit the patient to attempt to show the jury that his chances of
recovery were lessened to a measurable extent by the physician's shortcomings. In-
stead, the matter will be posited on an all-or-nothing basis ....
Id. at 81 (emphasis added). This passage highlights the prevalent attitude toward medical
malpractice until the middle of the 20th century. It is uncertain whether many courts still
view the policy implications in this manner. In his dissent in Herskovits v. Group Health
Cooperative, 99 Wash. 2d at 642, 664 P.2d at 491, however, Justice Brachtenbach quotes Ma-
lone for the proposition that where health care providers are implicated, courts should be
loathe to relax proof requirements. Justice Brachtenbach was apparently referring to the ma-
jority's holding that causation could be found from the loss of a 14 percent chance. Applica-
tion of the "pure" loss of a chance theory might not raise the same objections.
206. Malone, supra note 204, at 80.
207. Schaefer, Uncertainty and the Law of Damages, 19 WM. & MARY L. REv. 719, 762-63
(1978). In addition to the market theory rationale, Schaefer argued that while a specific gain
may not be achieved in a particular instance, some gains will be achieved when a series of
opportunities are involved. Id. at 762. Personal injury plaintiffs can make a similar argument.
While this particular patient might or might not have gained the desired outcome, some in a
group (or series) of patients would have experienced positive results. Thus, rather than deny
recovery because of proof problems, courts should recognize that a patient possessed at least a
chance, and award proportionate recovery. See also Delgado, supra note 47, at 892-93.
208. Schaefer, supra note 207, at 763.
209. Id.
210. Craig v. Chambers, 17 Ohio St. 253, 254, 261 (1867), cited in Cooper v. Sisters of
Charity, 27 Ohio St. 2d at 250, 272 N.E.2d at 102.
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but in a nation whose ideals consist of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi-
ness," 21' it is difficult to believe that even a small chance to live bears no
value whatsoever.212 The billions of dollars being spent on medical research
designed to save or prolong life clearly emphasize our general belief that life
is valuable. If the loss of an opportunity to benefit from a contract is deemed
valuable, how much greater should be the worth of a chance to live or a
chance to achieve greater health?2" 3
C. The Probability Theory
Another group of commentators has articulated a "probabilistic" ration-
ale for compensating lost chances. While this theory is more scientific, it is
also more complex. Its superficial complexity, however, should not detract
from an understanding of its true import.
Professor King, in his pioneering work on loss of a chance, posited the
following illustration:214 Suppose there is a jar, and that a jury determines,
after hearing evidence of the jar's contents, that it probably contains some
pennies. The jury then estimates that the jar contains forty cents. Thus, the
value of the jar is determined to be forty cents. If a defendant negligently
misplaced this jar, a court would award the plaintiff forty cents.
Now, take another jar, and suppose that the jury concludes after hearing
evidence that it contains one hundred coins, forty being worth one dollar,
and the remaining sixty having no value. If someone were to pick one coin,
there is a forty percent chance that a one dollar coin would be picked.215
Moreover, if one hundred individuals picked a coin from one hundred iden-
211. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
212. Professor Schaefer remarked, "an opportunity in which the chance of success is very
small may be quite valuable if the prize is great." Schaefer, supra note 207, at 763 n.165.
213. See Note and Comment, The Rule of Certainty in Damages and the Value of a Chance,
10 MICH. L. REV. 392, 394 (1911) (noting that there is less basis for denying recovery for loss
of a chance in tort cases since, contrary to contract cases, contemplation of the parties is
immaterial).
Lost opportunities are also valuable for other reasons. First, an individual who realizes that
his chances of survival have been reduced to almost nothing faces much greater stress than one
who still holds a hope for cure. Second, a person suffering from an incurable illness may find
that the negligence has shortened the number of years or months of life the patient previously
possessed. Therefore, there has been a loss of the opportunity to benefit from a potential scien-
tific breakthrough. At the time this article went to press, a new method of diagnosing and
treating cancer with "monoclonal antibodies" was being tested, with encouraging results. See
Sikora, Monoclonal Antibodies in Oncology, 1982 J. CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 369. See also
Tiple, Beyond Supermouse: Changing Life's Genetic Blueprint, 166 NAT'L GEOG. 818, 830-32
(1984).
214. See King, supra note 20, at 1353, 1376-77. The illustration has been somewhat
modified.
215. Id. at 1377.
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tical jars, each individual would pick, on the average, forty cents. The value
that would be lost were each person prevented from picking a coin would
therefore be forty cents.
Yet, courts applying the traditional causation rule will deny recovery in
the latter situation because the chance that a one dollar coin would be picked
is less than fifty-one percent. Based on this hypothetical, however, it would
be arbitrary to allow recovery in case of loss of the first jar while denying
recovery where a chance to pick a dollar coin from the second jar is de-
stroyed.2 1 6 To the plaintiff, the value of both jars is forty cents. But by
focusing on the one dollar coin, instead of the plaintiff's chances of picking
it, courts value the second jar differently.2 1 7 Undoubtedly, courts reason
that a person would either pick one dollar or nothing, and that to award
forty cents would be erroneous. But when the probabilities are finally ac-
counted for, it is beyond dispute that each chance is worth, on the average,
forty cents.
It would, of course, be preferable to know what the actual outcome would
have been absent the defendant's negligence. The responsibility for the harm
could then be attributed to its proper source. The loss of a chance concept,
however, operates precisely where several potential causes make it impossi-
ble to determine which force produced the harmful outcome. In the per-
sonal injury context, it is known that the victim picked "nothing" from the
"jar of life." But it is not known whether he would have picked the dollar
had it not been for the defendant's negligence.
Rather than throw this uncertainty entirely on the plaintiff or on the de-
fendant, the loss of a chance method awards damages in accordance with the
statistical chance of survival each individual originally possessed.2"' Where
a patient possessed only a twenty or thirty percent chance of survival, it will
appear that the patient would have died despite proper care. This conclu-
sion, however, ignores the reality that twenty or thirty patients in a group of
216. Id.
217. Realizing this, Professor Stein suggested that where each person in a group of 100
faces a 50% probability of suffering harm because of negligence, and therefore, statistically, 50
people will suffer the harm and 50 will not, half of the claimants will have been harmed be-
cause of the negligence. He argues, therefore, that these 50% chances should be recognized as
compensable interests. Plaintiffs' proof should then attempt to show the extent of the in-
creased susceptibility to (or lost chance to avoid) the harm. J. STEIN, PERSONAL INJURY AND
DEATH ACTIONS § 106 (1972).
218. The chance theory would also facilitate resolution of potentially perplexing fact pat-
terns. For instance, the traditional rule would have difficulty determining whether causation
could be found where a patient who initially possessed a seventy percent chance of survival
saw those chances reduced to 40%. See King, supra note 20, at 1378 n.85. The loss of a
chance rule would compensate the plaintiff for the 30% loss suffered because of negligence.
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one-hundred would have lived.2 19 It is impossible to know whether a partic-
ular victim fell within the percentage that would have survived. It is known,
however, that prior to the tort, the victim fell within the class of individuals
each possessing a twenty or thirty percent chance of survival. It is also
known that because of the defendant's negligence, the patient is now in a
group of patients possessing a smaller chance to live. To deny this reality
and award damages on an "all-or-nothing" basis fails to provide a remedy
commensurate with the interest the victim lost, namely, a chance for a better
outcome.
220
III. CHANCES AND THE TORT COMPENSATION SCHEME
A. The Vascillating Standard of Proof
The preceding discussion has argued that chances should be compensated
because they represent valuable interests. There are additional reasons for
integrating chances into the tort remedial structure, the most crucial of
which is the elimination of the incentives for courts to tamper with the tradi-
tional causation standard of proof.
When a victim of negligence is unable to establish, more likely than not,
that the defendant caused him harm, some courts manipulate proof require-
ments to allow the innocent plaintiff to recover from the admittedly negli-
gent defendant.221 In Thomas v. Corso,22 2 the Maryland Court of Appeals
allowed the case to go to the jury upon testimony that the decedent "may"
have survived with proper care.223 The Thomas decision seems to have low-
ered the proof requirement to the point where it has become meaningless.
The jury is allowed to engage in pure speculation in arriving at a finding of
causation. The same holds true for Jeanes v. Milner,2 24 where the court al-
lowed the jury to consider whether an eleven percent reduction in the pa-
tient's chances of survival caused the patient's death. It is difficult to
understand how the jury can infer, from the loss of an eleven percent chance
219. The respective chances enumerated in epidemiological studies reflect actual, observed
outcomes. If a patient's statistical chance of survival is 30%, it is because 30 of 100 (or 15 of
50, etc.) patients survived the particular ailment for the indicated length of time. To calculate
probabilities in this fashion is to follow the "relative frequency" method. Iversen, Operational-
izing the Concept of Probability in Legal-Social Science Research, 5 LAW & Soc'y REv. 331,
331 (1971). See Delgado, supra note 47, at 886 (noting that although 30 patients may have
died because of negligence, causation rules make it unlikely that any of the victims will be
compensated).
220. See Comment, supra note 47, at 893.
221. See supra notes 82-143 and accompanying text.
222. 265 Md. 84, 288 A.2d 379 (1972).
223. Id. at 94, 288 A.2d at 386.
224. 428 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1970).
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of survival, that death probably resulted because of negligence. A jury find-
ing of causation necessarily would be based upon speculation and conjecture
in such an instance.225
The case of Hamil v. Bashline226 is also troubling because it holds that a
prima facie case of causation is presented by evidence that the defendant's
negligence merely increased the individual's risk of harm. Admittedly, there
was evidence in Hamil that the decedent would have possessed a seventy-five
percent chance of survival with proper treatment.227 Under the Hamil
court's holding, however, a case could to go to a jury even in the absence of
any evidence that the plaintiff probably would have avoided the ultimate
harm with proper treatment.228 In this respect, the Hamil decision allows
the jury to speculate as to cause and effect. Moreover, Hamil retains the
requirement that the defendant's negligence be a substantial factor in pro-
ducing the harm. It thus perpetuates the inequities of the all-or-nothing
approach.
In Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative229 and Thompson v. Sun City
Community Hospital, Inc.,23° the fears raised in Hamil came to life. In
neither case was there evidence that the harm probably could have been
avoided with proper care.231 In Herskovits, the decedent lost approximately
a fourteen percent chance of survival. In Thompson, the individual would
have possessed approximately a five to ten percent chance of avoiding
residual leg impairment. Yet in both cases the jury was allowed to decide
whether the loss of those chances "probably" caused the person's injury. As
Justice Pearson remarked in his concurrence in Herskovits, evidence that an
225. See supra note 91. As noted in Justice Brachtenbach's dissenting opinion in Hersko-
vits v. Group Health Cooperative, 99 Wash. 2d at 609, 640, 664 P.2d at 474, 490, while evi-
dence of the loss of a chance is relevant in an evidentiary sense, "[there is an enormous
difference between the 'any tendency to prove' standard . . . and the 'more likely than not'
standard for proximate cause." Id. Even though several bits of evidence may provide enough
bricks to build a wall of probability, the evidence in Jeanes did not provide any such evidence.
226. 481 Pa. 256, 392 A.2d 1280 (1978).
227. Id. at 263, 392 A.2d at 1283.
228. See infra note 184.
229. 99 Wash. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983).
230. 141 Ariz. 597, 688 P.2d 605 (1984).
231. Because of this dearth of evidence, Justice Dolliver, in his dissent in the Herskovits
case, remarked, "whether the [decedent's] chances [of survival] were 25 percent or 39 percent
• . . in both cases, it was more probable than not he would have died." 99 Wash. 2d at 644,
664 P.2d at 492. The Justice cited the nearly century-old case of Davis v. Guarnieri, 45 Ohio
St. 470, 490, 15 N.E. 350, 361 (1887), where it was said, "[iut is legally and logically impossible
for it to be probable that a fact exists, and at the same time probable that it does not exist." 99
Wash. 2d at 644, 664 P.2d at 492. Therefore, it would be pure speculation, wrote the Justice,
for a jury to conclude that the defendant's negligence probably caused the patient's premature
death when all of the evidence indicated that the preexisting condition probably caused the
death. Id.
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individual lost a fourteen percent chance of survival gives the jury nothing
on which to base a finding of liability under the "more probable than not"
standard of proof.2 3 2 It does allow a finding that a chance of survival proba-
bly was lost. A finding of liability with regard to death or to permanent leg
impairment, however, would be the product of pure speculation.23 3
The foregoing decisions reflect the courts' inclination to hold a negligent
defendant liable when his negligence made it difficult to ascertain what
caused the harm. Although these courts purport to retain the probability or
more-likely-than-not standard, their new rules concerning the sufficiency of
proof allow those standards to be satisfied by evidence that a substantial
possibility of survival existed or that an individual possessed a small chance
of avoiding harm or of achieving a better result.
While departure from traditional proof requirements may be appropriate
in some contexts, 234 allowing plaintiffs to recover full damages235 upon the
introduction of such evidence invites irrational and inequitable results. The-
oretically, under these rules, one hundred physicians each responsible for no
more than a few deaths could face liability for the sum total of all the deaths
occurring.236 Altering proof requirements, therefore, is not the best solution
232. 99 Wash. 2d at 622, 664 P.2d at 480.
233. The Thompson case is also troubling because of its insistence that the jury find that the
harm probably resulted from the loss of a chance. While the Thompson opinion claims to
recognize the value of the "chance interest," it is in fact considering the chance interest only to
determine whether the lost chance "probably" caused the patient some overt harm. Thus, the
focus is not on lost chances as the injury, but rather on the ultimate harm, residual leg impair-
ment.
This retention of the more-likely-than-not test also distorts damages awards. Under the
court's approach, if a jury concluded that the loss of a 60% chance probably caused death, the
jury apparently would be expected to award only 60% of a normal damages award. If on the
other hand, the jury found that a lost chance of 15% "probably" did not cause the harm, it
would be expected to award no damages. The "all-or-nothing" approach thus becomes the
"something-or-nothing" approach. Therefore, although Thompson appears to favor plaintiffs,
it probably favors defendants on the issue of damages.
234. Typically cited is the context where two defendants act simultaneously and harm re-
sults. Only one actor, however, caused the harm. See, e.g., Kuhn v. Bader, 89 Ohio App. 203,
101 N.E.2d 322 (1951); State v. Newberg, 129 Or. 564, 278 P. 568 (1929). In one such situa-
tion, the California Supreme Court shifted the burden of proof to the defendants. Summers v.
Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
235. The Thompson court apparently would not require that full damages be awarded
where the jury concluded that the lost chance caused the ultimate injury. See supra note 233.
236. For example, by allowing a jury to find causation from an eleven percent loss, the
Jeanes court made it possible that defendant-doctors could face full liability for 100 deaths,
although, statistically, they caused only 11 deaths. It is difficult to imagine, however, that a
jury would actually find that the loss of an eleven percent chance constituted a "substantial
factor" in producing a patient's death. Of course, the jury might ignore causation require-
ments and award partial damages. See Orloff & Stedinger, infra note 249, at 1173.
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to the problems of proof faced by plaintiffs who have lost chances of
survival.
The loss of a chance theory, on the other hand, virtually eliminates the
difficulties presented by the traditional causation analysis. Courts no longer
would need to decide whether causation may be established by a possibility
rather than a probability. The mystery surrounding the meaning of the term
"substantial possibility" would be eliminated.237 Most importantly, plain-
tiffs and defendants would not be subjected to the current approach's "all-or-
nothing" system of compensation. Instead, a court would examine the vic-
tim's chances for a favorable outcome. If the plaintiff proved that the victim
lost a certain chance, the plaintiff could recover damages in proportion to
the proven loss.23 8
B. Escaping Liability by Creating Doubt
A third convincing reason to abandon the present compensation scheme
was articulated in Hicks v. United States.239 In Hicks, the court advanced
the notion that a tortfeasor should not escape liability because of the uncer-
tainty he has created regarding causation. 2" This rationale was accepted in
Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative,24 where a decedent lost a fourteen
percent chance of survival as a result of the health care provider's negli-
gence. The court stated that "it is not for the wrongdoer, who put the possi-
bility of recovery beyond realization, to say afterward that the result was
inevitable."242
This argument, however, does not warrant the elimination of traditional
proof requirements. Unfortunately, some courts maintain that the rationale
advanced in Hicks justifies throwing the burden of doubt entirely upon the
defendant.243 Such a rule, however, would expose tortfeasors to liability
greatly in excess of culpability.2" For the sake of fundamental fairness, if
nothing else, proportional redress should be the limit of compensation.
237. See generally Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626, 632 (4th Cir. 1966) (court in dicta
uses the phrase "substantial possibility").
238. See infra text accompanying notes 273-82.
239. 368 F.2d at 632.
240. Id.
241. 99 Wash. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983).
242. Id. at 614, 664 P.2d at 476.
243. Id. See Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp., Inc., 141 Ariz. at 608, 688 P.2d at
616; see also Note, Torts-Medical Malpractice-Rejection of "But For" Test, 45 N.C. L. REV.
799, 806 (1967) (physician should be fully liable if he caused the loss of plaintiff's chance of
escaping death or injury).
244. See supra note 236.
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C. "Justice" under the Chance and the Traditional Rules
In negligence actions, causation is often a very difficult determination to
make. When two potential causes of the harm exist, the inquiry becomes
even more complex. In an attempt to overcome this uncertainty in a loss of
a chance case, the current rule requires the jury to determine whether the
victim of negligence probably would have avoided the threatened harm "but
for" the defendant's negligence.245 While this method is fairly simple to ap-
ply, it does not adequately address the situation where a victim of negligence
cannot prove the harm probably would have been avoided "but for" the
negligence but where the victim nevertheless lost a valuable chance. The
loss of a chance theory fills this remedial gap by redefining the injury in
terms of lost chances and by tailoring damages to those chances. Since the
theory neither overvalues nor undervalues the chances, the inequities pro-
duced by the "all-or-nothing" standard are corrected, and fair results are
achieved in each case.246
Fair results, however, may not always be accurate. A result is "accurate"
when the jury finds the actual cause of the harm. Thus, a result would be
inaccurate if the jury concluded that the defendant's negligence caused the
harm when, in fact, a preexisting condition caused it.
Unfortunately, neither the traditional standard nor the chance theory re-
sults in accurate decisions in all cases. Under the traditional rule, some
plaintiffs will recover full damages although the defendant did not cause the
decedent's death. Others will not recover any damages although the defend-
ant's negligence caused the patient's demise.247 Under the chance rule, some
plaintiffs will receive a partial award proportionate to the size of the lost
chance even though negligence was not the cause of the harm. Conversely,
others who deserved full recovery will receive only a partial award.24 This
245. See supra note 29.
246. The all-or-nothing standard is prevalent in other areas of tort law, such as contribu-
tory negligence, contribution, and indemnity. The inequities that it invariably produces have
led many writers to urge its abandonment in those contexts as well. See Schwartz, Contribu-
tory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE L.J. 697, 722 n.112 (1978)
("[liability in proportion to fault is the slogan of comparative negligence"). See also Landes &
Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors. An Economic Analysis, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 550-52
(1980) (analyzing the economic efficiency of the rule of contribution among joint tortfeasors);
Schaefer, supra note 207, at 740-41; Ursin, Judicial Creativity and Tort Law, 49 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 229, 233 (1981). See generally Note, Comparative Negligence, 81 COLUM. L. REV.
1668 (1981).
247. For example, the deaths of 30 patients (in a group of 100) who would have lived with
proper treatment would not be compensated if their chances of survival did not amount to at
least 51%. If the patients each possessed a 70% chance, however, each death would be com-
pensated because it appears that each patient probably would have survived.
248. The death of a patient who possessed a 30% chance will always be compensated by
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unfortunate reality exists because it is impossible to determine whether the
harm would have resulted in the absence of negligence. Some erroneous de-
cisions are inevitable under either rule. An examination of both standards
should proceed, then, to an inquiry into which standard results in the most
equitable system of compensation.
Professors Orloff and Stedinger24 9 have tested the relative merit of the two
systems of compensation by using four criteria: First, they calculated the
total number of errors each method produced.25 ° Second, they determined
the number of dollars that would be paid erroneously to defendants and
plaintiffs because of these errors.2-1 Third, they determined the number of
"large" errors each system produced.25 2 Finally, they tested the bias of each
theory.2 53
Orloff and Stedinger's mathematical calculations reveal that the "all-or-
nothing" rule produces fewer numerical errors than the loss of a chance
rule.2 54 Moreover, the amount of money damages erroneously paid is
smaller under that rule than under the chance rule.25 5 Superficially, a rule
that produces fewer and smaller compensation errors seems preferable. Sat-
awarding the plaintiff 30% of a normal award. If the negligence actually caused the death, the
death will have been undercompensated by seventy percent. If the death resulted from a pre-
existing condition, the death will have been overcompensated by 30%.
249. See Orloff & Stedinger, A Framework for Evaluating the Preponderance-of-the-Evi-
dence Standard, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1159 (1983), upon which most of this segment was based.
Professors Orloff and Stedinger wrote their article in response to an earlier work authored by
Professor Kaye. See generally Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Stan-
dard: Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation, 1982 AM. B. FOUND.
RESEARCH J. 487. The Kaye article compared the proportionality (chance) rule with the pre-
ponderance of the evidence (current) rule, and concluded that under the current rule, fewer
dollars were paid mistakenly by defendants or were received mistakenly by plaintiffs. Id. at
502. The Orloff work analyzes further the variance between the two rules and concludes that
"[n]either rule is preferable under all of -the tests." Orloff & Stedinger, supra, at 1172. It
acknowledges, however, that the fact that fewer large errors are produced by the chance rule
makes that standard more bearable to the litigant of modest means. Id.
250. Orloff & Stedinger, supra note 249, at 1161-63.
251. Id. at 1163-65.
252. Id. at 1165-68.
253. Id. at 1168-71.
254. Id. at 1163. To compare the two rules, take a group of 99 patients who each possessed
a /3 chance of survival. The current rule would deny recovery in all 99 cases, as each patient
possessed a less than probable chance of recovery. Actually, however, 33 of the 99 would have
lived. Thus, the traditional rule produces 33 errors. The chance rule would award each plain-
tiff 1/3 of the normal value of the case. Yet only 33 patients would have survived. Thus, the 33
plaintiffs whose decedents would have survived with proper care will receive only 1/3 of the
deserved recovery, while the 66 whose decedents did not die as a result of negligence will be
overcompensated by 1/3. The chance rule therefore produces errors in all 99 cases.
255. Id. at 1164-65. The errors produced by the traditional rule are "complete errors,"
because no recovery is allowed where full recovery should have been granted. If a complete
error is held to equal X, the current standard produces errors (in the form of erroneous pay-
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isfied with these findings, however, critics of the chance rule fail to examine
several additional factors that may bear more heavily upon the decision
whether to retain or to reject the all-or-nothing approach.
The third factor is the number of large errors produced under each
rule.25 6 Large errors are extremely significant because they impact more
heavily on some parties than on others, depending upon the party's financial
standing.257 Large companies, for example, generally are able to prepare for
costly errors and to absorb their effects. 25" By contrast, individuals often are
unable to prepare for a financial disaster and may be "broken" by large er-
rors. If the injured party provided substantial financial support or extensive
household services, the loss of his contribution, coupled with the failure to
provide a remedy for that loss, may affect surviving family members se-
verely. 259 Large errors may cause bankruptcy, the loss of a home, or a great
reduction in the standard of living.26° Thus, a mere analysis of the number
and size of a rule's errors ignores the significance of the hardship large errors
produce in individual cases.261
According to Orloff and Stedinger, a calculation of the number of large
errors created by each rule reveals that the loss of a chance concept produces
significantly fewer large errors than the current rule.262 Thus, although the
chance rule creates more errors, the relative hardship created by the errors
may be less in many cases. In personal injury litigation, a rule that produces
fewer large errors should be preferable despite the greater number of
errors.
263
A final measure of the two rules' efficiency calls for a comparison of the
distribution of the errors each produces.264 This determination is important
ments) of the magnitude of 33X. The chance theory produces errors of the magnitude of 44X
(33 X 2/3X) + (66 X '/3X).
256. See id. at 1165-68. An error is "large" if the damages awarded are greatly dispropor-
tionate to the damages that should have been paid by the defendant or received by the plaintiff.
While there is no single formula for computing this factor, an often-used rule measures this
element by squaring the degree of deviation between the outcome produced by a rule and the
outcome such as it should have been if it were possible to know the real outcome of each case.
See Orloff & Stedinger, supra note 249, at 1165.
257. Id. at 1168.
258. Id.
259. See id. at 1167.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 1168.
262. Id. at 1165. Under the current rule, the difference between the "real" outcome and
the outcome achieved is 33X. Squaring this figure produces large errors of the magnitude of
33X2. The chance rule produces the following equation: 33 X (2/3X)2 + 66 x (1/3X) 2 =
22X2. Id. at 1166-67.
263. Id. at 1168.
264. Id.
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because it reflects the bias that is built into each rule. When a rule produces
compensation errors that systematically fall more heavily on plaintiffs than
on defendants, or vice-versa, there is bias.265 Orloff & Stedinger examine
this concept in terms of wrongful payments.266
The "all or nothing" rule throws wrongful payments either entirely on
defendants or entirely on plaintiffs.267 When it is found that the negligence
"more-likely-than-not" caused the harm, defendants always will be found
liable. In all cases where the chances are fifty percent or less that harm
would have been avoided, the plaintiffs will lose. This rule, therefore, creates
lopsided results and is biased.268
Under the loss of a chance theory, however, the defendants consistently
pay for the actual extent of the harm they have caused.269 Where one hun-
dred individuals each possessed a seventy percent chance of survival, the
defendants will pay for seventy deaths, rather than for one hundred deaths.
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, receive exactly the amount they deserve. If one
hundred plaintiffs each possessed a thirty percent chance, they will be com-
pensated, as a class, for thirty deaths. Under the "all or nothing" approach,
they would have received nothing, because of their less-than-probable
chances of survival. Under the loss of a chance rule, therefore, bias is virtu-
ally nonexistent.27 °
The foregoing comparison of the two systems of compensation demon-
strates that the loss of a chance rule casts less hardship on plaintiffs while
producing a more evenly-balanced system of compensation. This is because
the loss of a chance rule attempts to impose liability in proportion to
fault. 27 1 If a victim of negligence lost a thirty percent chance, the plaintiff
265. Id.
266. Id. Whenever a defendant incurs. a cost that he should not bear, or a plaintiff does not
recover an amount that is due him, there is a wrongful payment. Id.
267. Id. at 1169. See also Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A
"Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REv. 851, 881 (1984).
268. Orloff & Stedinger, supra note 249, at 1169. Because of the bias produced by the
current rule, Professor Kaye has acknowledged that the chance rule is preferable in this con-
text. Kaye, supra note 249, at 502-03.
269. Orloff & Stedinger, supra note 249, at 1169. See also Rosenberg, supra note 267, at
884-85.
270. Orloff & Stedinger, supra note 249, at 1169-70.
271. The imposition of liability in proportion to fault is becoming widespread in tort law.
It was recently followed in the products liability case of Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal.
3d 588, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 607 P.2d 924, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 286 (1980). In Sindell, a
cancer victim proved that she had been injured by DES, a drug her mother had ingested while
pregnant with her. She was unable to prove, however, which manufacturer had produced the
particular tablets her mother had taken. Therefore, she did not prove, more likely than not,
which company had manufactured the tablets. Without such proof, and with 200 potential
manufacturer-targets, there was only a small chance that any one caused the injury. Rather
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would recover thirty percent of a full damage award. Conversely, an indi-
vidual who lost a seventy percent chance would receive only seventy percent
of a full award. The thirty percent chance would never be treated as a zero
percent chance, as is currently done, and the seventy percent chance would
not be valued as if it were a certainty, because it is not.
2 72
IV. INCORPORATING THE CHANCE THEORY
A. Placing a Value on Chances
If it is accepted that chances represent "interests" worthy of protection, it
is necessary to outline a method by which plaintiffs may be compensated for
their loss. The preceding discussion has repeatedly alluded to proportional
recovery for the loss of a chance. At least three methods for assessing dam-
ages for such a loss are available to trial courts.
The simplest way to value chances is to allow the jury to determine the
proper value of a lost chance without extensive guidance from the court. A
jury would first determine the magnitude of the chance that was lost. Then,
it would subjectively evaluate the value of the lost chance, and arrive at an
award.2 73 This method would be simple to apply, and would permit the jury
than deny recovery altogether, the California Supreme Court adjusted causation principles by
placing on each defendant the burden of showing that it could not have produced the tablets in
question. 607 P.2d at 937. Absent such a showing, the defendant would be liable for damages
in proportion to its market share at the time of the mother's ingestion of the drug. Id. Since
there was a chance that one of the five named defendants caused the injury, each was held
liable in proportion to that chance (represented by the company's market share at the time the
drug was ingested).
Liability in proportion to fault also underlies recently enacted comparative negligence stat-
utes. See Schwartz, supra note 246.
272. It is difficult, of course, to predict the precise effects the chance rule would have upon
plaintiffs and defendants. Two comments, however, should be made. First, defendants' over-
all administrative costs may or may not increase. More suits might be brought because of the
new rule, and these would need to be defended against or settled. It must be remembered,
however, that many suits are presently brought and settled even though causation is debatable.
Thus, even administrative costs may not increase. Second, an increase in administrative costs,
if any, should be mitigated by the lower total damages payed by defendants. This lower payout
of damages should result because chances that are too insignificant to warrant the filing of a
lawsuit would continue to go unpaid, and chances that are very significant would receive only
proportionate awards, rather than the current 100 percent awards.
273. See, e.g., Chaplin v. Hicks, [1911] 2 K.B. 786 (C.A.). It is likely that juries presently
factor into their damage awards the relative value that they deem has been stripped from the
plaintiff. See Kalven, The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 OHIo ST.
L. J. 158, 164-68 (1958). See also Orloff & Stedinger, supra note 249, at 1173 ("juries fre-
quently apply the [chance] rule, [despite being instructed to apply the traditional rule]").
Thus, lost chances may already be receiving compensation in spite of the all-or-nothing ap-
proach. It is also widely known that settlement offers often originate because of unclear liabil-
ity, as where defendants realize that there was negligence and that it conceivably may have
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great leeway in granting what it felt was an appropriate award. It is most
useful where there is a dearth of statistical proof regarding a negligence vic-
tim's chances of avoiding harm. However, because the goal of the chance
concept is to allocate correctly damages among plaintiffs and defendants,
another method of valuation would be preferable where medical evidence
regarding an individual's chances of survival is available.
Another method of valuation, which can be employed best with statistical
proof, awards damages in direct proportion to the chance of survival that the
plaintiff lost.2 74 Under this method, if the jury determined that a patient lost
a forty percent chance to live, it would then be instructed to assess wrongful
death damages and to multiply the figure it reached by forty percent. 275
This method, commonly termed the "simple probability" method of valua-
tion,276 allocates damages more accurately while offering simplicity and ease
of application.
The simple probability method, however, is not always as accurate as a
third method of valuation, called the "weighted mean" method.277 The dif-
ference between these two methods can best be explained through the follow-
ing illustration, conceived by Professor King.278 Suppose that, because of
the defendant's negligence, a previously healthy patient incurs a thirty per-
cent chance of developing blindness at some future date. Medical testimony
establishes that the most likely date of onset is age fifty. The jury then deter-
mines that the value of the plaintiff's vision at age fifty is $100,000. Under
the simple probability method, the jury would multiply $100,000 by the
thirty percent chance, and award $30,000 in damages.279
A more precise valuation of the plaintiff's lost chance to avoid blindness
might be possible if the medical testimony could assess the chances of devel-
oping blindness at several future dates, rather than at only one. Assume, for
instance, that a medical expert can state that the patient's chances of becom-
ing blind at age fifty are twenty-five percent; at age forty, four percent; and at
produced the harm. The effect of a settlement in those circumstances is to award some value
for the patient's lost chances (if any).
274. See King, supra note 20, at 1382.
275. Thus, lost earnings, loss of consortium, and other standard elements of wrongful
death damages would be assessed and weighed by the finder of fact in the same fashion that
ordinary wrongful death damages are estimated.
276. See Note, The Labor-Management Relationship: Present Damages for Loss of Future
Contracts, 71 YALE L.J. 563, 571 (1962). See also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 25, at § 31.
Others have called it the "expected value" rule. See Orloff & Stedinger, supra note 249.
277. King, supra note 20, at 1384.
278. Id. While the example concerns a claim for future consequences, a similar analysis
could be applied to a case involving a preexisting condition, since both variations deal with lost
chances and probabilities.
279. Id. at 1383.
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age thirty, one percent. Again, the overall chance is thirty percent. The jury
then determines that the loss of the plaintiff's eyesight at age fifty would
result in a $100,000 loss, at age forty in a $200,000 loss, and at age thirty in a
$300,000 loss. The weighted mean method would then multiply the value of
the plaintiff's eyesight at each age by the percentage probability of the plain-
tiff losing his eyesight at that age to arrive at an award.280
This last method may appear to call for rather complex testimony and
mathematical calculations, and may lead some to fear that it would be un-
manageable. The calculations involved, however, are no more complex than
those undertaken in a sophisticated claim for lost future wages, where future
bonuses, benefits, and promotions must be factored into a final damages
award.281 In any event, judges should not allow the difficulty of assessing
damages to defeat a plaintiff's right to recovery.28 2
B. The Problem of Statistics
Probabilistic and statistical evidence comprises a substantial portion of the
evidence submitted in loss of a chance actions. This is because there is usu-
ally no direct proof of the causal connection between the defendant's negli-
gence and the victim's injury. For lack of better evidence, plaintiffs' counsel
rely on statistics that show the outcome achieved by individuals similarly
situated to the victim. 28 3
The use of statistics in trials, however, has created great controversy
among both judges and commentators. It has been argued that statistics
are often misleading, and may lead the finder of fact to erroneous conclu-
sions. Some believe that juries are overly impressed by numbers that epi-
280. Id. at 1384. In the example given, the plaintiff would receive: ($100,000 x 25%) +
($200,000 x 4%) + ($300,000 x 1%) = $36,000. While this method yielded a higher result
than the simple probability method, the amount of the recovery depended upon the value of
the lost chance at various dates. The result achieved would have been different had the values
of the victim's eyesight at ages 30 and 40 been varied.
281. See generally DEUTSCH & RAFFA, DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS §§ 109.00-.80 (1984).
282. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 26, at § 27.
283. In some cases, even statistical evidence may not be available. In such cases, the jury
should be permitted to estimate the plaintiff's chances of survival, based on any available evi-
dence. See Kaplan, supra note 195 (discussing the personalistic method of estimating
probabilities). Damages, of course, should reflect the degree of the chance the plaintiff lost.
284. See, e.g., Dickson, Medical Causation by Statistics, 17 FORUM 792 (1982); Finkelstein
& Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83 HARV. L.REv. 489 (1970); Fin-
kelstein & Fairley, A Comment on "Trial by Mathematics," 84 HARV. L.REv. 1801 (1971);
Tribe, Trial by Mathematics.- Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARv. L.REv. 1329
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Tribe I]; Tribe, A Further Critique of Mathematical Proof 84
HARV. L.REv. 1810 (1971); see also Brachtenbach, Future Damages in Personal Injury Ac-
tions-The Standard of Proof 3 GONZ. L.REv. 75 (1968).
285. An oft-cited example by courts and commentators is that of a colorblind pedestrian
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demiologists and lawyers throw out during the course of a trial.2" 6 Thus,
many courts require that to establish causation, the plaintiff must introduce
"particularistic" proof of the fact in dispute.2" 7 It is reasoned that "particu-
laristic" evidence represents "harder" proof, and that such proof is necessar-
ily more reliable than probabilistic evidence.28 8
There is some validity to the concern over the use of "naked" statistical
evidence to prove causation of either death or some other overt injury.28 9
who is hit by a cab. The town in which he lives features two cab companies. One owns three
blue cabs, the other, one orange cab. It is argued that if statistics alone are looked to in
determining causation, the Blue Cab Co. will end up paying for all accidents caused by cabs
involving colorblind individuals. For a more provocative example of the possible misuse of
statistics, see People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497, 438 P.2d 33 (1968). For a
more recent example of misuse of statistical evidence, see Cramer v. Morrison, 88 Cal. App. 3d
873, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1979).
286. Professor Lawrence Tribe of Harvard has argued that "the very mystery that sur-
rounds mathematical arguments-the relative obscurity that makes them at once impenetrable
by the layman and impressive to him-creates a continuing risk that he will give such argu-
ments a credence they may not deserve and a weight they cannot logically claim." Tribe I,
supra note 284, at 1334. Tribe's contention has been attacked by two scholars, who claim:
"Influential as Tribe's paper has been, like much legal scholarship, it is a Swiss cheese of
assumptions about human behavior." Saks & Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adju-
dication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 123, 125 (1981) (footnotes omitted). One
commentator asserts that "[c]ontrary to Tribe's assumption, individuals do not tend to be
overly impressed with statistical information. . . . If anything, they give it too little atten-
tion." Brook, Inevitable Errors: The Preponderance of the Evidence Standard in Civil Litiga-
tion, 18 TULSA L.J. 79, 98 (1982).
287. See Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D. S.C. 1981); Namm v. Charles E.
Frosst & Co., 178 N.J. Super. 19, 427 A.2d 1121 (App. Div. 1981); DePass v. United States,
721 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1983). In his dissent in DePass, Judge Posner chastised the majority for
upholding a federal district court's refusal to admit statistical evidence in a personal injury
suit. He stressed that the compensatory goal of tort law "cannot be attained or even ap-
proached if judges shut their eyes to consequences that scientists have found are likely to
follow from particular types of accidents, merely because the scientists' evidence is statistical."
Id. at 206-10.
288. See Saks & Kidd, supra note 286, at 150.
289. See cases cited supra note 285. But see Saks & Kidd, supra note 286, at 151-54 (con-
tending that all "particularistic" proof is in fact probabilistic). One writer has commented:
"All knowledge of past as well as future events is probabilistic. Inevitably it rests on intuitive
or more rigorously acquired impressions of the frequency with which similar events have oc-
curred in like circumstances." Rosenberg, supra note 267, at 870. See also W. PROSSER & W.
KEETON, supra note 1, at 270 (noting that proof of causation is nothing more than a projection
based upon previous observation).
While opponents of the use of statistical evidence in trials warn that such evidence is unrelia-
ble, it must be answered that the eyewitness account, the "paradigm" of particularistic evi-
dence, is one of the most unreliable methods of proof known. Rosenberg, supra note 267, at
872. See also Winter, The Jury and the Risk ofNonpersuasion, 5 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 335, 338
(197 1) ("[t]here is surely no way of saying that a careful assessment of 'mathematical chances,'
which concedes the possibility of error, is less reliable evidence than a direct statement based
on a witness' perceptions, which are also subject to error, however unconceded." Id.).
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Loss of a chance plaintiffs, however, are not introducing statistical evidence
to prove causation. Rather, they are attempting to establish the extent of the
harm that they have suffered.290 Thus, the question facing courts is how to
measure damages. The use of statistics to prove damages has been accepted
for years.291 Loss of a chance plaintiffs, therefore, should be allowed to in-
troduce statistical evidence concerning a victim's chances of survival.
If statistical evidence is permitted into evidence, each litigant should be
afforded the opportunity to contest and argue the reliability of the other
party's evidence. If some studies are shown to be less reliable or less perti-
nent than others, the jury should be free to assess the comparative value of
the studies. Counsel, through cross-examination, would be afforded the op-
portunity to refute the validity of a particular item of evidence by showing
that a study's test controls were flawed or that they were incomplete in some
respect, or that the variables upon which the results were premised are some-
how inapplicable to the case at bar. At the close of the evidence, the jury
would determine what chance, if any, the victim had lost.
C. Wrongful Death and Time Limitation Statutes
1. Death Statutes and the Chance Theory
If a court decides to grant recovery for the loss of a chance, it will con-
front the prohibitive legal wall known as the "wrongful death statute." Such
statutes, patterned after Lord Campbell's Act,292 typically require a showing
290. See Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative, 99 Wash. 2d at 635 n.2, 664 P.2d at 482
n.2 (Pearson, J., concurring) ("The statistical data relating to the extent of the decedent's
chance of survival are considered to show the amount of damages, rather than to establish
proximate cause.").
291. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 334-39 (1977); D.
BARNES, STATISTICS AS PROOF (1983). Statistics are also admitted in civil rights cases, Hazel-
wood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977); in antitrust cases, United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 304-07 (D. Mass. 1953), afid per
curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); and in fraud actions, Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 185 F.2d 58, 60
(4th Cir. 1950).
292. Lord Campbell's Act provides in part:
Whereas no Action at Law is now maintainable against a Person who by his wrong-
ful Act, Neglect, or Default may have caused the Death of another Person, and it is
oftentimes right and expedient that the Wrongdoer in such Case should be answer-
able in Damages for the Injury so caused by him; 'Be it therefore enacted by the
Queen's most Excellent Majesty. . . . That whensoever the Death of a Person shall
be caused by the wrongful Act, Neglect, or Default, and the Act, Neglect, or Default
is such as would (if Death had not ensued) have entitled the Party injured to main-
tain an Action and recover Damages in respect thereof, then and in every such Case
the Person who would have been liable to an Action for Damages ..
9 & 10 Vict CAP. XCIII (93) (26th Aug. 1846) (emphasis added).
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that the negligent act or omission "caused" the victim's death.2 93 Because of
these statutes, wrongful death plaintiffs have phrased their complaints in
terms of causation of death. In loss of a chance cases, however, a plaintiff is
not trying to recover for a wrongful death, but for the loss of a chance to
avoid the death. A concurring judge in the Washington case of Herskovits v.
Group Health Cooperative,294 realizing the problems posed by the Washing-
ton wrongful death statute, explained that he would interpret the wrongful
death statute as being applicable to loss of a chance cases.2 95 The judge
rationalized this result by pointing to the nebulous meaning of the word
"cause." 2 96 A person would be found to have "caused" another's death
"whenever he cause[d] a substantial reduction in that person's chance of
survival."'2 97 This rationale is rather unattractive, as it leaves the focus on
causation of death, rather than on damages.
In order for plaintiffs to recover properly for these losses, then, these stat-
utes should probably be amended. Only minor changes in the language of
the states' respective wrongful death statutes, however, would be neces-
sary.298 These statutory amendments should stress that there is a right of
action for the negligent deprivation of a chance of survival. It should be
explained that the injury for which a remedy is provided is the chance of
survival, rather than death. The judge29 9 or jury would evaluate the magni-
tude of the lost chance, and award proportionate recovery, rather than at-
tempt to find causation of death from the fact of a substantial reduction in
chances. The statutes would emphasize that chances are compensable only
in proportion to their magnitude. Thus, even the loss of an eighty percent
chance would not warrant full recovery.
Any statutory amendment should also address the type of proof admissi-
ble in loss of a chance cases. Since the issue would be one of calculating
damages, statistical proof should be sufficient to establish the degree of harm
293. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8301 (1982) ("an action may be brought to recover
damages for the death of an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect ... of another
. ... ); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377 (West 1973) ("when the death of a person . . . is
caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another, his heirs . . . may maintain an action for
damages .... ").
294. 99 Wash. 2d at 619, 664 P.2d at 479 (Pearson, J., concurring).
295. Id. at 634, 664 P.2d at 487.
296. Id. at 635 n.1, 664 P.2d at 487 n.1.
297. Id. at 635, 664 P.2d at 487.
298. The writing of such an amendment is beyond the scope of this article. Therefore, only
brief suggestions will be presented.
299. A judge will make factual determinations in suits against the United States brought
under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The Act does not give plaintiffs a right to trial by jury.
See 28 U.S.C. 2402 (1982).
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suffered by the victim.3°°
2. Statutes of Limitations and Future Consequences
Statutes of limitations may present a problem where a victim faces a possi-
bility of future harm but has not yet suffered the harm. As in other loss of a
chance cases, courts insist upon proof of a probability future harm.3°' If no
such proof is available, one court has hinted that the plaintiff may have to
wait until the harm materializes before bringing suit.3 2 To deny recovery
until the harm occurs, however, may cause the plaintiff to fall outside of the
statute of limitations.30 3 Moreover, witnesses may die, or their memories
may fade. To deny recovery until the harm occurs, therefore, may foreclose
any recovery by the plaintiff. While there may be ways in which statutes of
limitations could be circumvented, it is difficult to see how necessary evi-
dence could be preserved and the defendant's presence guaranteed. Thus,
recovery should be allowed although the victim has not yet suffered the ulti-
mate harm.
Moreover, waiting until the harm occurred would not aid in the determi-
nation of causation. No matter how long one waited, it would never be pos-
sible to determine whether the preexisting condition or the subsequent loss
300. See supra notes 290-91 and accompanying text.
301. See, e.g., Healy v. White, 173 Conn. 438, 443-45, 378 A.2d 540, 544 (1977); Evers v.
Dollinger, 95 N.J. 399, 471 A.2d 405 (N.J. 1984); Davidson v. Miller, 276 Md. 54, 62, 344
A.2d 422, 427-28 (1975); Blakeman v. Gopp, 364 P.2d 986, 992 (Wyo. 1961).
A few cases have allowed or argued for recovery for the mere possibility of furture harm. In
Feist v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 267 Or. 402, 517 P.2d 675 (1973), the plaintiff sought recovery
where the defendant's negligence created a possibility that the plaintiff might some day con-
tract meningitis. The court allowed the jury to assess the value of the newly created suscepti-
bility and to award proportionate damages. A later Oregon case, Pelcha v. United Amusement
Co., 44 Or. App. 675, 606 P.2d 1168 (1980), provided recovery where the defendant's negli-
gence created a 30% to 45% possibility of the need for future surgery. Id. at 677-78, 606 P.2d
at 1168-69.
In Jordan v. Bero, 210 S.E.2d 618 (W. Va. 1974), a concurring opinion asserted:
[R]equiring a man to stand in the arena and open one of two doors [one housing a
tiger] is in and of itself a separate injury. The fact that a person is confronted with a
ten percent, fifteen percent, or twenty percent probability (in the mathematical sense)
that he will suffer future injuries should be sufficient to permit him to recover for
those future injuries at least in proportion to the probability of such injuries occur-
ring. . . . If a man can demonstrate that there is a twenty percent probability that
he will have future injuries which would, if they occurred, result in damages to him
in the amount of one hundred thousand dollars, he should be able to recover twenty
thousand dollars from the defendant, which recovery would represent the injury of
incurring a twenty percent probability of suffering one hundred thousand dollars
worth of damages.
Id. at 640-41.
302. Evers v. Dollinger, 95 N.J. 399, 406, 471 A.2d 405, 409 (1984).
303. See generally Rosenberg, supra note 267, at 895 n.168.
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of a chance produced the harm.3" For example, if a breast cancer patient
possessed a twenty percent risk of recurrence of the cancer prior to the negli-
gence, and such patient now possesses a forty percent risk, the finder of fact
would not be in a better position, in the event of death, to determine whether
the patient could have been saved had proper and timely treatment been
rendered.3" 5 Thus, the victim should be allowed to bring an action in the
usual fashion, and recover for the increased risk of harm.3°6
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment has argued that chances to live, to achieve a positive out-
come or to avoid an injury represent valuable interests. Purely visceral feel-
ings dictate such a conclusion. Market theories and probabilistic concepts
reinforce this human intuition. The all-or-nothing rule's denial of this real-
ity is arbitrary and leads to an inefficient system of tort remedies. Further-
more, it unfairly casts the burden of uncertainty created by the defendant
upon the innocent plaintiff. Finally, while the rule seeks to provide compen-
sation to injured victims of negligence, it fails to tailor the remedy to their
injuries. Tortfeasors and victims are thus treated as pawns in an "all-or-
nothing" lottery.
To remedy these inequities, courts must broaden their focus and examine
the interests the victim has lost. It must be recognized that chances are
valuable interests. Where negligence reduces a patient's chances to avoid
harm, the plaintiff should be compensated. That compensation should par-
allel the extent of the harm-the loss of the chance-the victim has suffered.
Until this is done, courts sitting in personal injury actions will undoubtedly
continue to modify causation and proof principles in an effort to correct an
304. In Evers v. Dollinger, 95 N.J. at 421, 471 A.2d at 405, the concurring justice ques-
tioned the court's holding that a mere risk of future harm should not be compensable in the
absence of materialization of that harm. He then added:
I do not dispute the significance of resultant harm in the overall analysis of medi-
cal injury and assessment of damages. I do not believe, however, that such resultant
harm constitutes a sine qua non, a condition precedent before there can be recovery
for an actual albeit unquantified increase in the risk of such harm. The Court is here
troubled by a seeming inability to quantify the risk of future cancer. But, adding the
incurrence of future harm as a requirement for the recovery for such increased risk
does not resolve the dilemma since the risk still remains unquantified. . . . The in-
advertent effect of such a court rule is that those victims, who undeservedly have
been put in greater peril in terms of their survival, are not permitted to be compen-
sated for this peril unless they have suffered a resurgence of their cancer.
Id. (Handler, J., concurring).
305. Id.
306. See, e.g., James v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1980). For a discussion
of James, see supra notes 171-81 and accompanying text.
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obviously deficient remedial structure. These modifications, however,
merely aggravate the deficiencies within that structure. It is therefore urged
that chances be recognized as valuable interests, and accorded their proper
place in the spectrum of tort damages.
Stephen F. Brennwald
